Zetetic Scholar - No 11

Magazine Overview

Title: Zetetic scholar
Issue: No. 11
Date: August 1983
Publisher: Marcello Truzzi
Country: USA
Document Type: Magazine Issue

Articles and Content

This issue of Zetetic Scholar, the journal of the Center for Scientific Anomalies Research (CSAR), is noted as being the largest to date and a celebration of its 10th published issue. The editorial highlights the journal's irregular publication schedule, which is tied to subscriptions for two issues rather than a calendar year, and outlines a new format to facilitate timely releases: a stimulus paper and its commentaries in one issue, with the author's reply in the subsequent issue.

Key Articles and Themes:

• Confessions of a Fortean Skeptic by Jerome Clark: This article revisits the author's past involvement with the Cottingley Fairies photographs, initially taken by two young girls in England. Clark recounts his youthful fascination and later skepticism, detailing how initial evidence, including photographic expert testimony, seemed to support the authenticity of the images. He discusses how debunkers like Houdini offered unconvincing explanations, and how later research, including analysis by Ground Saucer Watch and Fred Gettings, revealed the figures to be cardboard cutouts, likely from a children's book. Clark reflects on his own credulity and the importance of common sense, cautioning that the debunkers' errors do not automatically validate proponents' claims.

• The Mars Effect Controversy: Several articles delve into the 'Mars Effect,' a phenomenon linking planetary positions at birth to personality traits. Patrick Curry and Piet Hein Hoebens offer their perspectives, responding to a reappraisal published in The Skeptical Inquirer. Antony Flew and Hans J. Eysenck also contribute to the discussion, with Eysenck evaluating the effect and Marcello Truzzi providing a reply. The editorial notes that the pieces by Flew and Eysenck were submitted before the Skeptical Inquirer's reappraisal, which is described as a response to earlier ZS articles. Michel Gauquelin, whose work is central to the Mars Effect, is mentioned as finding the reappraisal 'courageous.' The editorial emphasizes the importance of independent studies to test Gauquelin's findings and expresses hope for future cooperation between CSAR and CSICOP.

• Uncanny Prophecies in New Zealand? by Richard Kammann: This article explores unexplained scientific anomalies related to prophecies originating from New Zealand.

• Parapsychology: Gerd H. Hövelmann presents "Seven Recommendations for the Future Practice of Parapsychology," followed by critical commentaries from a wide range of experts including John Beloff, Susan J. Blackmore, H.J. Eysenck, Brian Inglis, Stanley Krippner, and others.

• Crypto-Science: Ron Westrum contributes a piece titled "Crypto-Science Rides Again: A Reply to My Commentators."

• Fire-Walking: Marcello Truzzi provides a bibliography on the topic of fire-walking.

Regular Features and Editorials:

• Editorial: Marcello Truzzi discusses the late arrival of issue #11, the upcoming issue #12, and the journal's publication schedule. He also announces that the Center for Scientific Anomalies Research (CSAR) is becoming better organized with plans for special events and membership information. Truzzi reiterates ZS's policy of publishing original work and clarifies that an article by Jerome Clark, previously published in a UFO publication without permission, does not indicate a change in ZS policy. He addresses reader inquiries about invited commentators, explaining that many invited experts decline participation.

• New ZS Dialogue: This section features Gerd H. Hövelmann's recommendations on parapsychology, accompanied by extensive critical commentaries from various scholars.

• Exchanges & Continuing Dialogues: Michael Martin discusses defining "UFO," with a reply from J. Allen Hynek. John Palmer defends parapsychology in a reply to James E. Alcock, who also responds. Ron Westrum addresses his commentators on crypto-science.

• Special ZS Bibliographic Features: Marcello Truzzi offers "A Bibliography on Fire-Walking."

• Book Reviews: Reviews include "Immanuel Velikovsky's Stargazers and Gravediggers" by Henry H. Bauer, "The Fakers: Exploring the Myths of the Supernatural" by Danny Korem and Paul Meier (reviewed by Douglas H. Ruben and Marilyn J. Ruben), and "Books Briefly Noted" by M. Truzzi.

• Letters: Richard de Mille writes from Santa Barbara, CA, responding to a previous discussion (ZS 10:154) regarding Carl Sagan's views on intelligence evolution on other planets, arguing that Sagan's statements are not necessarily contradictory.

• About the Contributors: A detailed list of the issue's contributors, including their academic affiliations and areas of expertise, is provided.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this issue revolve around the critical examination of anomalous phenomena, skepticism, and the methodology of scientific inquiry into the paranormal. The editorial stance, as articulated by Marcello Truzzi, emphasizes a commitment to rigorous, evidence-based investigation, a willingness to explore controversial topics, and a desire to foster constructive dialogue within the scientific community. There is a clear distinction made between genuine scientific inquiry and what is perceived as advocacy or pseudoscientific claims. The journal aims to be a platform for debate, encouraging critical analysis and self-correction within fields like parapsychology and the study of anomalies, while also acknowledging the complexities and potential pitfalls of both belief and disbelief.

This issue of Zetetic Scholar, dated 1983, focuses on the importance of critical thinking and skepticism in the study of paranormal phenomena. The main article, "Uncanny Prophecies in New Zealand: An Unexplained Scientific Anomaly" by Richard Kamann, delves into the case of Emory Royce, a psychic who made several seemingly accurate predictions.

The "Open-Mindedness" Trap

The issue begins by critiquing a mindset that is overly accepting of paranormal claims, describing it as a "Will to Believe coupled with the Refusal to Disbelieve." The author argues that while mystery is intriguing, the pursuit of it should not overshadow the search for answers. True progress in paranormal inquiry, it is suggested, comes from celebrating the solutions of mysteries rather than their perpetuation. Charles Fort is presented not as a lover of mysteries, but as an eccentric who exposed the "pompous humbug" of authority figures who preferred ignorance to understanding.

The article criticizes "anomaly-phobia," the tendency to dismiss or explain away anomalous phenomena, citing examples like the Air Force's explanations for UFO sightings and the inept criticisms of psychic phenomena by debunkers. It also touches upon the exposure of errors and baseless claims made by those who present themselves as defenders of science and reason.

Principles for Critical Inquiry

Kamann outlines five principles for approaching paranormal claims with a grounded perspective:

1. Don't assume that the experts are always fools: While acknowledging that scientists are human and fallible, the article stresses that specialists in their fields possess far more knowledge than laypeople. However, when experts venture outside their areas of expertise, they should be treated as amateurs.
2. Don't believe every story you hear: The author shares an anecdote about a man with impeccable credentials who spun elaborate, unsubstantiated tales, illustrating the danger of accepting stories at face value, especially those presented as "Soldier's Tales" or "Horrendous Secrets I Learned in the Service."
3. Don't get emotionally involved: Emotional commitment to a belief or claim can lead to irrational defensiveness and a distorted perception of truth, where the perceived truth is valued over factual evidence. This applies equally to debunkers and believers.
4. Don't hesitate to criticize: The article distinguishes between "skeptics" (who doubt) and "debunkers" (who deny), advocating for the former. It suggests that the paranormal field needs more critical review from genuine skeptics who familiarize themselves with the literature. The responsibility for policing the field often falls on researchers themselves, who must carefully assess data, as some claims hold up while others collapse under scrutiny.
5. Don't assume that all mysteries, even the genuine ones, have solutions: The author uses the example of the Loch Ness Monster to illustrate that some phenomena might be mundane or eventually yield uninteresting explanations. He also points to scientific explanations for previously mysterious phenomena like "skyquakes" and the moving rocks of Racetrack Playa.

The overarching message is a call for seriousness, caution, and carefulness, leading to a more skeptical approach, which is in the true Fortean spirit of questioning establishment humbuggery and one's own.

Uncanny Prophecies in New Zealand

The central case study involves Emory Royce, who made several predictions on a March 10, 1982, radio program in Dunedin, New Zealand. The predictions included:

• The end of a senior world leader: Coded as "ten dot ten," this prediction was later linked to the death of Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev on November 11, 1982. Royce had sent himself a registered letter containing the name "Brezhnev" to verify the prediction.
• No smelter in Dunedin: This prediction related to a proposed aluminium factory at Aramoana, which was ultimately cancelled. The article details the optimistic headlines preceding the prediction and the subsequent reversal of fortune for the project.
• A man-made disaster involving a structure bathed in water: This was later matched to the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano and the British ship HMS Sheffield during the Falklands War. The prophecy was made three weeks before Argentina's invasion.
• A government scandal: Royce also forecast a scandal involving Mr. Muldoon and Works Minister Mr. Quigley.

Kamann presents these four prophecies as having a 100% success rate, excluding one prediction that lacked a time boundary. While not claiming Royce is precognitive, he finds the amount of correct detail sufficient to rule out simple explanations like retrofitting or chance coincidence, calling for further rational explanations if the case is not a valid scientific anomaly.

Could the Brezhnev Prediction Have Been Tricked?

Kamann addresses the possibility of trickery, particularly concerning the registered letter used for the Brezhnev prediction. Having been personally involved, he confirms that the letter, mailed shortly after the radio program, contained the name "Brezhnev," thus eliminating the need for a magician's trick to introduce information into a sealed envelope.

Saving Successes and Forgetting Failures

The article touches upon the common tendency for psychics and astrologers to save their confirmed predictions while forgetting their failures. However, it argues that Royce's case is different, as he made few other recollections of predictions, suggesting a genuine, albeit untested, personal belief in his abilities.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The issue strongly advocates for a rigorous, evidence-based approach to paranormal research. It emphasizes the importance of skepticism, critical thinking, and the avoidance of emotional bias. The editorial stance aligns with the Fortean tradition of questioning established narratives and authority, but extends this skepticism to the proponents of anomalies themselves, urging a careful examination of all claims, whether from believers or debunkers. The goal is to uncover genuine anomalies through careful investigation rather than perpetuate mysteries or fall prey to unsubstantiated claims.

This issue of Zetetic Scholar, dated 1983, focuses on two primary areas: a political scandal in New Zealand and the ongoing "Mars Effect" controversy. The magazine presents itself as a journal for the scientific investigation of paranormal claims, often featuring debates and critical analyses.

Mid-Year Scandal Involving the Prime Minister

The issue begins with an article detailing a political event in New Zealand during mid-1982. The National Party was in power, with Robert Muldoon serving as Prime Minister and D.F. Quigley as the Minister of Works and Development. The article highlights a political "flare-up" in June 1982 involving Muldoon and Quigley. This event is identified by a commentator named "Royce" as the fulfillment of a prophecy concerning a government scandal, marked by a code word and a specific time frame.

Royce claims to have received a prediction of a scandal occurring around the middle of the year, associated with a code number "fourteen dot thirteen." On June 7, 1982, D.F. Quigley publicly criticized Prime Minister Muldoon's "think big" economic strategy, stating it was not understood or supported by New Zealanders. Muldoon gave Quigley an ultimatum: retract the speech or move to the back benches. On June 15, the Otago Daily Times reported that Quigley resigned from the cabinet rather than compromise his honesty, effectively being "sacked."

Subsequent headlines indicated that Muldoon faced internal party challenges. "THINK BIG DEBATE STIFLED" reported criticism from the Young Nationals. "MULDOON INVITED MINOGUE TO QUIT" detailed how another Member of Parliament, M.J. Minogue, was "expressly invited" to resign for holding independent views. Quigley received significant public support. Other reports mentioned a Cabinet Minister cancelling engagements for fear of reprisal and a "DIRECTIVE DENIED" regarding ministerial statements on the growth strategy. A "LEADERSHIP TEST FOR MULDOON" was anticipated, with the possibility of Muldoon losing leadership in a party caucus. Additionally, 150 Young Nationals resigned in protest. Although Muldoon survived the crisis, its repercussions were felt for some time.

The article further explores Royce's decoding of the prophecy. Royce explains that "fourteen" represented the combined seven letters of "Muldoon" and "Quigley," and "thirteen" represented the number of letters in "Robert Muldoon" or "Prime Minister," linking the event to Muldoon's leadership. The main events occurred around June 21, fitting Royce's "middle of the year" prediction. The article also notes the involvement of M.J. Minogue, whose name also has seven letters, further supporting Royce's interpretation.

In "Final Comments," the author reflects on the case, noting that it was investigated early and predictions were expected to have a weak confirmation level. The author was surprised by the concurrent events of the burning and sinking of two ships in the Falkland Islands and the cancellation of the Dunedin smelter, alongside the Quigley political crisis. The author also mentions a prediction related to "Brezhnev" being in a registered letter, which was seemingly fulfilled by the Soviet leader's death shortly after the predicted time zone, though this prediction was not part of the main "scandal" analysis.

The author acknowledges the difficulty in calculating the statistical probability of these predictions but estimates it to be very high. The article concludes by noting the widespread attention these predictions received in New Zealand media and overseas, and the author's ongoing reflection on possible rational explanations for the alleged precognition.

The Mars Effect Controversy

The latter half of the magazine is dedicated to the "Mars Effect" controversy, a debate concerning alleged correlations between the positions of planets at birth and career success, primarily associated with the work of Michel Gauquelin. This section features several articles and letters from various individuals, including Patrick Curry, Antony Flew, Piet Hein Hoebens, and others, many of whom are associated with or critical of CSICOP (Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal).

Curry on CSICOP's "Reappraisal"

Patrick Curry writes regarding his article in ZS 9, "Research on the Mars Effect." He expresses frustration that CSICOP principals did not reply to his article, attributing this to allegations that he is an "astrologer" and that he failed to consult CSICOP before writing. Curry details his correspondence with George Abell and Paul Kurtz of CSICOP in 1981 and 1983, where he sought input for his report on the CSICOP vs. Gauquelin claims. Despite sending drafts of his article to various CSICOP members, including Abell, Kurtz, Marvin Zelen, Ray Hyman, and Ken Frazier, no substantive comments or corrections were received. Curry argues that CSICOP's subsequent "reappraisal" of the Mars Effect experiments in The Skeptical Inquirer admits errors but questions whether it goes far enough.

Antony Flew on the "Mars Effect" Controversy

Antony Flew, a Fellow of CSICOP, expresses concern that CSICOP has made a "dreadful mess" of its dealings with Michel Gauquelin. He highlights two points made by commentators: Piet Hein Hoebens' suggestion that skeptics may have been surprised when the Mars Effect failed to yield expected skeptical results, leading to a shift in strategy; and H. Krips' observation that Gauquelin's theory lacks a satisfactory explanatory mechanism, suggesting that statistical significance does not imply causation. Flew also references contributions from Marcello Truzzi and Richard Kammann, who address similar points. He discusses the challenges of investigating paranormal phenomena, particularly "precognitive" correlations, where ordinary means of information acquisition are ruled out by definition.

Piet Hein Hoebens: Some Further Reflections on the Mars Effect Affair

Piet Hein Hoebens notes that the Mars Effect controversy continues despite calls for a truce. He addresses comments from Ad McConnell & Clark, expressing respect for McConnell's intentions but objecting to his "intemperate rhetoric" and "inquisitorial approach," which Hoebens believes may have obscured valid points and discouraged serious examination of the issue. Hoebens defends Richard Kammann's paper "The True Disbelievers" as a fair and restrained statement from a skeptic who has made significant efforts to help CSICOP address the Mars Effect issue. He argues that Kammann's verdict, though critical of some CSICOP members, is based on scrupulous evidence examination.

Hoebens also comments on CSICOP's handling of internal and external criticisms, finding their response "tragically inadequate." He mentions being unsatisfied with CSICOP's version of Dennis Rawlins' "excommunication" but believes the facts do not fully support the "worst scandal" theory of suppressing dissent. He acknowledges that CSICOP has responded courteously to his own criticisms, treating his dissent as legitimate. Hoebens notes CSICOP's public corrections of past mistakes, such as publishing Rawlins' "Remus Extremus" and the "Re-appraisal" by Abell, Kurtz, and Zelen, suggesting the leadership is not entirely unresponsive.

However, Flew maintains that the Mars Effect fiasco is not merely a series of innocent errors but likely driven by political expediency over intellectual integrity. He expresses suspicion of the motives of some vehement critics of CSICOP, comparing them unfavorably to Mr. Klass's "CRYBABY."

A Modest Proposal

Flew concludes with a "modest proposal" to address doubts about CSICOP's credibility. He suggests that CSICOP should become re-involved in the scientific debate by proposing a new test of cosmobiology with Michel Gauquelin, Richard Kammann, Dennis Rawlins, and others. Flew believes this would allow CSICOP to prove the Mars fiasco was an isolated lapse and would help answer the fundamental question of whether planetary effects exist and how they can be explained.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The issue consistently engages with the tension between skepticism and the investigation of paranormal claims. The editorial stance appears to favor rigorous scientific inquiry and critical evaluation, while also acknowledging the complexities and potential biases within both skeptical and paranormal research communities. The magazine provides a platform for debate, particularly concerning the scientific methodology and internal politics of organizations like CSICOP. The "Mars Effect" controversy serves as a central case study for examining these issues, highlighting debates about evidence, interpretation, and the integrity of scientific discourse.

This issue of Zetetic Scholar, dated 1983, focuses on two primary topics: the scientific evaluation of the 'Mars Effect' and the complex issue of defining a 'UFO'. The magazine presents a debate between proponents and critics of these phenomena, featuring contributions from prominent figures in parapsychology and ufology.

The Mars Effect and Its Evaluation by Hans J. Eysenck

Hans J. Eysenck's article critically examines the 'Mars Effect', a phenomenon suggesting a correlation between planetary positions at birth and excellence in certain professions. Eysenck argues that the Mars Effect cannot be evaluated in isolation, but must be considered within the broader context of the Gauquelins' extensive research, which includes correlations between planetary positions and other professions (e.g., Saturn Effect, Jupiter Effect, Venus Effect, Moon Effect), as well as relationships between personality and planetary positions at birth.

Eysenck contends that the Gauquelins' findings, including the link between planetary positions and personality, significantly strengthen the evidence for the Mars Effect. He also references Francoise Gauquelin's work, which relates planetary positions to personality variables, suggesting it supports the idea that these correlations are not merely accidental. Eysenck criticizes the tendency to dismiss these findings, comparing the argument against the Mars Effect to the historical dismissal of phenomena like the precession of Mercury's perihelion.

He addresses Marcello Truzzi's points, agreeing that criticisms from CSICOP were often presented unscientifically. However, Eysenck finds Truzzi's arguments unconvincing on certain aspects. Eysenck emphasizes that the Gauquelins' work has established a 'paradigm' that requires further scientific investigation. He highlights the importance of studying the relationship between planetary position and personality in normal individuals, not just exceptional ones, and notes the finding that this correlation only holds for natural births, not induced ones.

Eysenck also critiques the CSICOP's approach to the Mars Effect, particularly their study involving basketball players, which he suggests was designed to reduce the effect's statistical significance. He calls for a collaborative effort between cosmobiologists and psychologists to plan future research, advocating for rigorous methodology and mutual satisfaction between critics and proponents.

Reply by Marcello Truzzi

Marcello Truzzi, the editor, responds sympathetically to Eysenck's points regarding the strengthening of neo-astrological causalities by the Gauquelins' corpus of research. However, Truzzi clarifies that his previous 'Reflections' paper focused specifically on the CSICOP approach to the Mars Effect as a single claim. He maintains that critics should aim to minimize the revolutionary character of an anomaly, attacking its most conservative form, rather than presenting it as maximally anomalous.

Truzzi discusses the concept of causality, noting that in modern science, causality is understood as a high degree of correlation, often embedded within a nomological network of theories. He acknowledges that the Gauquelins' work might be building such a network, even if it is currently minimal and somewhat detached from mainstream science. Truzzi agrees with Eysenck that the Mars Effect, if real, is an anomaly that warrants serious investigation, but stresses the need for independent replications and the elimination of alternative explanations before neo-astrology can gain scientific acceptance.

More on Defining a "UFO" by Michael Martin

Michael Martin's article addresses the challenges of defining a 'UFO', responding to comments from J. Allen Hynek, Jenny Randles, and Hilary Evans on his previous paper. Martin critiques Hynek's definition, arguing that it is too vague and potentially includes non-UFO phenomena. He defends his own definition, which emphasizes that being unidentified is relative to a classification scheme.

Martin then addresses Jenny Randles' points, agreeing that a definition of UFO doesn't inherently lead to knowing what UFOs are, but it clarifies concepts. He disputes Randles' claim that a luminous mass phenomenon is similar to UFOs, stating it doesn't fit his definition as it wasn't a flying object or originating from the atmosphere. He also clarifies that his definition does not assume only unidentified objects are of scientific interest.

Regarding Hilary Evans' proposed definition, Martin finds it too simplistic and potentially inaccurate. He argues that Evans' definition excludes unreported UFO events and phenomena that are primarily bright lights rather than distinct objects. Martin reiterates his own view that a UFO is best understood through the continuous flow of reports, emphasizing that the phenomenon is defined by what is reported and remains unidentified even after competent study.

Reply by J. Allen Hynek

J. Allen Hynek replies to Michael Martin's critique, acknowledging the difficulty of defining 'UFO' as an 'unidentified' phenomenon. He suggests that definitions are functional and depend on existing knowledge, using the example of defining a 'star' with varying levels of scientific detail. Hynek argues that a working definition of UFO should not be based on assumed origins (e.g., extraterrestrial) and should focus on the reports themselves, as 'we do not study UFOs, we study UFO reports'.

Hynek proposes that a UFO is what is described in UFO reports and remains unidentified. He notes that many phenomena in science and human experience are unidentified, and UFO reports should be considered within this context. He uses the analogy of fishing, where anything brought up in the net (UFO reports) is part of the catch, regardless of whether it fits a pre-existing definition of 'fish'. Hynek also presents Hilary Evans' definition and critiques it for excluding unreported events and bright lights.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this issue revolve around the scientific methodology for investigating anomalous phenomena, the nature of evidence and interpretation (correlation vs. causation), and the challenges of definition and classification in fields where empirical data is often subjective or incomplete. The editorial stance, as indicated by the choice of articles and the contributions from Truzzi and Hynek, appears to be one of encouraging rigorous scientific inquiry into these 'borderland' areas, while maintaining a critical perspective and emphasizing the need for clear definitions and robust evidence. The publication, Zetetic Scholar, positions itself as a forum for such critical and open-minded scientific exploration.

This document is an article from Zetetic Scholar #11, published in 1983. The article, titled "IN DEFENSE OF PARAPSYCHOLOGY: A REPLY TO JAMES E. ALCOCK" by John Palmer, serves as a detailed critique of James E. Alcock's book "Parapsychology: Science or Magic?" (1981). Palmer aims to defend the field of parapsychology against what he perceives as Alcock's unfair, arrogant, and destructive polemic.

Alcock's Critique and Palmer's Rebuttal

Palmer begins by characterizing Alcock's book as part of a series by CSICOP members aiming to discredit parapsychological research by labeling it unscientific. While acknowledging that Alcock's book covers many arguments against parapsychology, Palmer contends that Alcock's approach is highly polemical, personal, and condescending, forcing Palmer to adopt a combative stance rather than a collaborative one. Palmer identifies three key rhetorical devices Alcock employs: biased selection of references, righteous hyperbole, and the presentation of metaphysical dogma as rationality.

Part I: Do Parapsychologists Behave Like Scientists?

Palmer addresses Alcock's central theme that parapsychologists behave more like magicians than scientists. Alcock suggests that parapsychologists cynically present themselves as scientific to legitimize their "magical" ideas. Palmer refutes this by examining Alcock's claims about parapsychological research.

#### A. Process-Oriented Research

Alcock claims that parapsychological research is almost entirely focused on demonstrating the existence of psi, neglecting exploration of its integration with psychological and physical processes. Palmer counters this by citing numerous studies from the last decade (1971-1980) that investigated relationships between psi and psychological variables, including altered states of consciousness, individual differences, and cognitive processing. He conducted a survey of experimental reports published in major parapsychological journals, finding that 60% included exploration of relationships between psi and "normal" psychological or physical variables. Palmer argues that Alcock's implication that these studies are merely attempts to extend demonstrations of psi is unsubstantiated.

Palmer highlights Stanford's "Psi-Mediated Instrumental Response" (PMIR) theory as a prime example of formal theorizing and hypothesis testing in parapsychology, linking psi to need reduction theory. He notes that Alcock completely ignores this theory and related research, despite claiming parapsychology lacks serious theory and testable hypotheses. Palmer criticizes Alcock for selectively focusing on early research by figures like Helmut Schmidt while ignoring their later work based on theoretical deductions.

#### B. One-Shot Miracles?

Alcock criticizes parapsychologists for failing to follow up initial findings, characterizing their research as "a series of one-shot demonstrations." Palmer acknowledges that some examples support this, but argues that it is equally easy to cite refuting examples, such as long-term research projects. His survey indicated that 37% of studies were attempts to replicate or extend previous findings, suggesting that Alcock's characterization creates a misleading impression.

#### C. Parapsychology and Physics

Palmer criticizes Alcock's dismissal of efforts to account for psi through extensions of modern quantum physics. Alcock complains that such arguments shift the debate to a technical plane inaccessible to non-physicists. Palmer suggests Alcock objects to theories he cannot understand. He points out that "observational theories" based on quantum mechanics have been empirically tested. Palmer argues that Alcock uses biasedly selected references and straw man arguments, such as extrapolations from relativity theory, the EPR paradox, time reversal, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, and tachyons, without referencing reputable paraphysicists who might endorse such ideas. Palmer notes that Alcock briefly mentions Schmidt's and Walker's theories but dismisses them condescendingly, despite their sincere efforts to integrate psi with modern physics in scientifically valid ways.

#### D. Criticism Within Parapsychology

Alcock claims that criticism within parapsychology is generally "subject oriented" and limited by a diversity of belief about what constitutes "real" psychic phenomena. Palmer disputes this, citing extensive within-subject criticism in parapsychological journals, particularly concerning ESP and PK research. He points to a significant controversy over Tart's ESP-learning research as an example of robust internal debate. Palmer argues that Alcock ignores this evidence, which is derived from journals Alcock himself cites. He also notes that much criticism occurs during manuscript review processes for journals and conventions.

Alcock also complains about a lack of theoretical controversy. Palmer counters that controversy exists, citing the debate over "observational theories" and other topics like the distribution of psi, the role of altered states of consciousness, and survival of death. He concedes that most criticism is methodological rather than theoretical, but sees no issue with this, refuting Alcock's implication that theoretical controversy is necessary for methodological criticism.

#### E. The Experimenter Effect: Parapsychology's "Catch-22"?

Alcock claims the psi hypothesis is unfalsifiable due to the "experimenter effect" (EE), which he suggests is used to "explain away" nonsignificant results. Palmer clarifies that responsible parapsychologists acknowledge that some experimenters are more successful than others and that "belief" may be a factor. However, they do not claim psi is intrinsically impossible for skeptics or that negative results inherently support the hypothesis. Palmer argues that Alcock misconstrues the EE, citing a specific instance where he himself offered a "social psychological factor" as a possible explanation for a failed replication, which he acknowledges could be misconstrued as a claim of objective preferability. Palmer emphasizes that such possibilities, especially when arising from methodological differences, have heuristic value for research.

Palmer explains that both sides agree on a relationship between experimenter attitudes and psi results, with studies even treating experimenter belief as a predictor variable. Alcock suggests "believers" conduct incompetent experiments, while parapsychologists offer two "psi" explanations: that believing experimenters better inspire confidence in subjects, or that the experimenter's psi, not the subject's, is responsible. Palmer finds the first explanation plausible, drawing parallels to drug research and Rosenthal's experimenter bias research. He argues that these explanations do not imply skeptics cannot obtain positive results and that belief is likely a correlate, not a direct cause, of psi variability.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The article consistently defends parapsychology as a legitimate field of scientific inquiry, challenging the criticisms leveled by Alcock. Palmer emphasizes the importance of rigorous methodology, theoretical development, and internal critique within the field. The editorial stance of Zetetic Scholar, as implied by publishing this defense, appears to be open to exploring claims of the paranormal and critically examining critiques of such research, advocating for a balanced and fair assessment of the evidence.

This document is a review of a book by Alcock, critically examining his arguments against parapsychology. The review, published in 'Skeptical Inquirer', Volume 10, Issue 5, dated September/October 1985, challenges Alcock's methodology, his use of rhetoric, and his overall case against the existence of psychic phenomena.

Section F: Ignoring "Normal" Interpretations

The reviewer addresses Alcock's accusation that parapsychologists ignore 'normal' explanations for observed phenomena. The reviewer counters that researchers typically eliminate such artifacts during the design phase, making it unnecessary to address them extensively in the 'Discussion' section. The reviewer notes that Alcock criticizes a parapsychologist (Tart) for not dealing with artifacts in the design phase, calling it a 'Catch-22'.

Section G: Ad Hominem Attacks

This section focuses on Alcock's alleged use of ad hominem attacks, particularly against Helmut Schmidt and Hal Puthoff. Alcock is accused of misrepresenting Schmidt's comments on Uri Geller, implying Schmidt was deceived by a fake performance when he was actually commenting on observations by other scientists. Similarly, Alcock implies Puthoff is untrustworthy due to his past involvement with Scientology, which Puthoff states was brief and many years ago. The reviewer suggests Alcock's tactics resemble McCarthyism and questions why science needs such 'muckraking' if its arguments are sound.

Section H: Overstating the Case

The reviewer acknowledges that Alcock has a legitimate point when criticizing parapsychologists for not adequately presenting opposing viewpoints, citing the 'Handbook of Parapsychology' as an example. However, the reviewer argues that Alcock himself is biased and overstates his case, using selective references and misleading summaries. The article contends that skeptical books are often as one-sided as those written by psi proponents.

Section I: Parapsychology and the Media

This section discusses the media's sensationalized portrayal of parapsychology. The reviewer agrees with Alcock that the media often focuses on 'psychics' and 'frauds,' which harms the field's reputation. However, the reviewer disputes Alcock's claim that parapsychologists are disinterested in separating genuine research from fraud, citing examples of parapsychologists actively working to protect the public from psychic fraud and cooperating with debunkers.

Section J: Conclusion

The reviewer concludes that parapsychologists generally behave like other scientists, despite the challenges posed by the elusive nature of their subject. Alcock's impression of parapsychology is created through rhetorical devices, primarily biased selection of references and misleading summaries. The reviewer urges readers to consult the 'Suggested Readings' in Alcock's book to get a more balanced perspective.

PART II: THE CASE AGAINST PSI

The reviewer states that in Part II, the focus will shift to Alcock's arguments against the existence of psychic phenomena.

A. What Constitutes Evidence for Psi?

This section delves into the definition of 'psi' and what constitutes evidence for it. The reviewer proposes a definition of psi as a statistically significant departure from chance under controlled conditions, with precautions against artifacts. Alcock's assertion that statistical evidence is not 'proof' is dismissed as a straw man argument. The reviewer also argues that the 'psi hypothesis' is falsifiable, contrary to Alcock's claims, and that Alcock seems confused about this point, citing an example involving Helmut Schmidt and cockroaches.

B. Other Statistical Nonsense

This part addresses further statistical criticisms by Alcock. The reviewer dismisses Alcock's devaluation of psi experiment results based on small effect magnitudes, stating that small effects are common in modern physics. Alcock's attempt to discredit PK dice studies using Oram's results is also rejected as irrelevant due to incomparability of methods.

C. Bundles of Sticks

The reviewer discusses the skeptical argument that there is no 'conclusive experiment' ruling out all normal explanations. The reviewer points out that Alcock himself rebuts this by stating that it's impossible to eliminate all contaminating variables. The article criticizes Alcock for embracing this criterion when proposed by a skeptic but rejecting it when used by parapsychologists. The 'bundle of sticks' approach, where multiple studies collectively build a case, is central to parapsychology, but Alcock dismisses it as relying on 'weak studies'. The reviewer argues that while individual studies must meet minimal methodological standards, Alcock unfairly denies parapsychologists the use of this principle.

Replicability and the 'Bundle of Sticks' Approach

The reviewer acknowledges that while there is some replicability in parapsychology, it is not widespread enough to support a claim of conclusive evidence. However, the reviewer strongly disagrees with Alcock's claim that there is 'not even a prima facie case for the existence of psi'. The 'bundle of sticks' approach is explained as a standard scientific practice in fields like psychology, where conclusions are drawn from a collection of studies. The reviewer argues that Alcock dismisses this approach for parapsychology by labeling the individual studies as 'weak', without providing a clear definition of what constitutes a 'sufficiently strong experiment'.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring theme is a critical examination of Alcock's book and his skeptical arguments against parapsychology. The reviewer consistently defends parapsychologists' methodologies, statistical practices, and ethical considerations, while accusing Alcock of using biased selection, misleading summaries, and ad hominem attacks. The editorial stance is one of critical engagement with skeptical claims, advocating for a fair and balanced assessment of the research in parapsychology.

This document appears to be an excerpt from a scholarly article or book review, likely published in a journal focused on parapsychology or psychology. It critically examines the work of a skeptic named Alcock, particularly his book "Parapsychology: Science or magic?" The text delves into methodological critiques, the influence of metaphysical biases, and the nature of scientific inquiry.

Critique of Alcock's Methodological Standards

The author begins by dissecting a specific experiment cited by Alcock, conducted by Alcock and Otis (1980), which concluded that paranormal believers tend to be less skilled in critical thinking than skeptics. The author finds this experiment to be "weak" and poorly designed, with a methodology so flawed that even the authors admitted its results could not be considered conclusive. The sample selection (introductory psychology students) is criticized as biased, given that psychology professors are often hostile to the paranormal, potentially influencing students' responses. The author suggests that students might identify with their professors' attitudes rather than the intrinsic merits of the beliefs themselves. A significant lapse noted is Alcock's failure to ascertain possible biases in how subjects held their beliefs, especially given that a substantial portion of the sample (25%) rejected the phenomena described in the attitude scale, contrary to a general survey finding of only 3% skeptics at the same university.

The author then turns to Alcock's critique of an experiment by Tart concerning out-of-body experiences (OBEs). Alcock's critique is characterized as using "rhetorical devices" to make the experiment appear weaker than it was. These devices include latching onto obscure loopholes, exaggerating defects, and portraying the experimenter as biased or incompetent. Alcock highlighted that Tart admitted the results could not be considered conclusive and questioned Tart's handling of potential cheating methods, such as reflections from a clock face. The author defends Tart's initial exploratory study, suggesting that while not methodologically rigorous, it deserved some weight. The author posits that Alcock's dismissal of inconclusive psi experiments as "evidentially worthless" is a logical fallacy, akin to the "conclusive experiment" argument.

The "Bundle of Sticks" Criterion and Evidence for Psi

The author discusses the "bundle of sticks" criterion for assessing the case for psi, suggesting that the number of experiments showing positive evidence is enormous, with many trends exhibiting moderate repeatability and conceptual coherence. While acknowledging that some experiments may misinterpret artifacts as psi, the author contends that many are robust enough to be published in professional psychology journals if the claims were less controversial. Alcock is criticized for not seriously addressing this body of evidence in his book. The assessment of this evidence is presented as subjective, depending on factors like the a priori probability assigned to the psi hypothesis. The minimum claim that can be made is that parapsychologists have established a "prima facie case for psi."

Metaphysics and Intolerance in Science

Part III of the text focuses on "Parapsychology, Science, and Metaphysical Dogma," specifically addressing "Metaphysics and Intolerance." The author argues that science should be a process of unbiased observation, theory development, and testing. This requires an open-minded yet critical attitude. The author contends that while "objectivity" is an ideal, metaphysical thinking can be dogmatic, leading scientists to observe only what conforms to their beliefs. Alcock is accused of mixing metaphysics and science, particularly by accusing parapsychologists of doing so. Alcock's prejudices are described as transparent, exemplified by his opening statement in a chapter on "Magic, Science, and Religion," which lists atrocities committed in the name of religion but omits those committed in the name of secular ideologies.

Alcock's intolerance is further illustrated by his criticism of parapsychologists for entertaining paranormal interpretations of unexplained outcomes. Examples include his critique of a study where judges' bias influenced results, and Schmeidler's suggestion that psi "could" have been used in an experiment. Alcock's criticism of Morris' review of Backster's plant psi research is also highlighted, where Alcock dismisses the possibility of an "experimenter effect" as an alternate explanation. The author argues that emerging sciences need the freedom to entertain hypotheses, even ad hoc ones, for potential breakthroughs.

Alcock's Dogmatism and the Definition of Science

The author criticizes Alcock's lack of tolerance for explanatory frameworks for psi, such as Schmidt's and Stanford's models, which Alcock dismisses as "magical thinking" for not postulating "intermediate steps." The author counters that even respectable physics, like quantum mechanics, involves concepts without clearly defined intermediate steps. The author also points out that "black box" behaviorism, a dominant force in psychology, also relied on hypothetical constructs without fully defined mechanisms. The author suggests that Alcock's issue is not merely the lack of mechanism but a deeper resistance.

Regarding whether psi contradicts science, Alcock implies that if psi were true, "science as we know it cannot." The author refutes this, stating that science would not abandon its conventional laws because they work. Parapsychology, the author argues, does not contradict psychology and physics any more than botany contradicts geology; they deal with different classes of events. The existence of psi, if proven, would not threaten science but would stimulate scientists to enrich their theories. The threat is to those who believe current scientific theories provide a complete description of reality, which is seen as a metaphysical urge rooted in dogma.

Science, Dogma, and Materialism

The author concludes that Alcock uses metaphysical dogma to censor scientific theorizing, particularly by embracing Bunge's principles distinguishing "science" from "pseudo-science." The eighth principle, which states that pseudo-science admits "elusive immaterial entities" while science deals with "changing concrete things," is interpreted as an attempt to shackle science to materialism. The author questions whether materialist constructs are inherently more productive than mentalist ones, especially across the full range of psychological topics. The author advocates for the freedom to entertain both materialist and mentalist concepts, viewing them as potentially complementary rather than competing descriptions of reality.

Conclusion

The author reiterates that Alcock has used implicit metaphysical arguments to deny parapsychologists the freedom to employ certain theoretical concepts. The author believes that modern parapsychological theorizing is inspired more by quantum physics than magic, and that censorship is unjustified. Metaphysics is seen as a threat only when it dictates rather than provides ideas. The piece ends by quoting Alcock on the difficulty of recognizing one's own resistance to disconfirming information, suggesting this resistance is a key factor in the ongoing debate.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this document are the critique of skeptical methodologies in parapsychology, the influence of metaphysical biases (particularly materialism) on scientific discourse, the definition and boundaries of science, and the importance of intellectual freedom in scientific inquiry. The editorial stance is clearly critical of dogmatic skepticism and advocates for an open-minded, yet rigorous, approach to parapsychological research, free from ideological censorship.

Title: Zetetic Scholar
Issue: #11
Date: 1983
Content Type: Journal/Magazine Issue

This issue of Zetetic Scholar features a lengthy article by James E. Alcock titled "SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, AND PARAPSYCHOLOGY: A REPLY TO DR. PALMER." This article serves as a detailed response to a review by Dr. Palmer, likely of Alcock's book, addressing several key points of contention regarding parapsychology.

Alcock's Defense Against Palmer's Review

Alcock begins by expressing surprise at the tone of Dr. Palmer's review, describing it as "highly polemical, extremely arrogant, and completely destructive in intent." He contrasts this with positive feedback he received from other reviewers, including parapsychologist Robert Morris, who found his book "thought-provoking" and recommended it to both laypersons and professionals.

Alcock organizes his response into several "issues" that encapsulate Dr. Palmer's criticisms.

Issue #1: Do Parapsychologists Behave Like Scientists?

Alcock argues that parapsychologists often behave more like magicians than scientists. He points to the tendency to explain phenomena based on wishing or belief without understanding causal chains, likening it to "natural magic." He cites Stanford's comment on psychokinesis (PK) occurring without sensory guidance or information processing as an example of this magical thought. Alcock criticizes the willingness to accept claims based on anecdotal evidence of a needle moving under controlled conditions, rather than on statistical departures from chance in experimental settings. He acknowledges that there is variability among parapsychologists, with some being skeptical, but focuses on those who argue that the existence of psi is no longer in question and that research should focus on its characteristics. Alcock suggests that when good scientific sense is lacking, magical thinking can offer a false sense of success.

He also addresses Palmer's dismissal of his earlier chapters, which discussed how people can deceive themselves. Alcock reiterates his point that all individuals are prone to magical thinking and distorted perceptions of reality. He states that the rise of scientific methodology was a response to the need to protect conclusions from personal biases, emphasizing the importance of control groups for objective evaluation.

Alcock defends his use of control groups, explaining that their purpose is to minimize or eliminate extraneous variables and ensure freedom from their influence. He criticizes the idea that formal control conditions are not necessary or would not be more successful in identifying artifacts, stating that this shows a lack of self-confidence compared to scientists in other fields.

He stresses that even if psi does not exist, people will have experiences that seem extraordinary. Alcock clarifies that his comment about resistance to disconfirming information was not "unwittingly insightful" but a direct observation about human nature, applicable to everyone, including himself and Dr. Palmer.

Alcock explains that he deliberately chose to quote extensively from parapsychologists and proponents of psi in his book to support his arguments and avoid the charge of an outsider's bias. He notes that Dr. Palmer accused him of using "heavyweights" to criticize paraphysics, but Alcock asserts that his criticisms are often echoed by other parapsychologists.

Issue #2: Is Parapsychology Without Adequate Theory and Does It Consist Mainly of One-Shot Miracles?

Alcock defends his statement that much of the parapsychological literature focuses on demonstrating that psi occurs, rather than on theory-directed research. He admits he may have been too harsh in characterizing it as solely "one-shot miracles" but maintains that parapsychological theories are not well-developed. He quotes Rex Stanford's 1973 Presidential Address, which stated that parapsychology lacks suitable conceptual development, with research often aimed at producing scoring trends or differences between groups, rather than exploring the underlying mechanisms or causal factors.

Stanford's address also noted that correlations with attitude or personality variables have been major findings, but these have not been followed up to make inferences about causal factors. Alcock agrees with Stanford that this level of analysis is insufficient to gain notice from skeptical scientists.

Regarding theory, Alcock discusses Dr. Palmer's mention of Stanford's "Psi-Mediated Instrumental Responding" (PMIR) model. Alcock argues that even this model, which attempts to relate psi to need-reduction theory, describes magical processes, as it assumes an organism can employ ESP and PK unconsciously to satisfy needs.

Alcock also addresses Palmer's criticism of his inclusion of a footnote quoting philosopher Stephen Braude's critique of "observational theories" in parapsychology. Alcock defends this by stating that Braude is a philosopher and that his critique highlights the weak conceptual underpinnings and lack of explanatory power of these theories, which is relevant to his argument about the lack of robust theoretical competition in the field.

Issue #3: Does Modern Quantum Mechanics Lend Support to Parapsychology?

Alcock sarcastically notes Dr. Palmer's suggestion that he finds quantum-mechanical theorizing difficult to understand. Alcock, who has a degree in physics with extensive coursework in quantum mechanics, argues that the injection of quantum mechanics into parapsychology is often used to intimidate critics and legitimize claims without proper scientific scrutiny. He states that while quantum mechanics is relevant, it is intellectually dishonest to claim its support for parapsychology when the audience cannot judge the validity of the arguments.

Alcock concedes that he may have been too harsh on paraphysicists (researchers with physics backgrounds) who discuss physics and psi. He acknowledges that some show caution, but criticizes the simplistic arguments often presented to the public that misrepresent quantum mechanics to suggest it makes psi possible. He argues that it is improper to use unresolved paradoxes in quantum mechanics as support for psi hypotheses.

Alcock criticizes the tendency to draw inspiration from quantum mechanics to explain phenomena like "key-bending." He dismisses the idea that atoms straining to bend a key is a valid explanation, comparing it to magical speculation. He concludes that parapsychologists who make such egregious use of quantum mechanical arguments are severely uninformed and should stick to more appropriate areas.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The central theme of this issue is a critical examination of parapsychology from a skeptical, scientifically-oriented perspective. Alcock consistently argues for the importance of rigorous scientific methodology, including the use of control groups and the development of testable theories. He criticizes the reliance on anecdotal evidence, magical thinking, and the misapplication of concepts from other scientific fields, particularly quantum mechanics, to support parapsychological claims. The editorial stance, as represented by Alcock's reply, is one of strong skepticism towards the current state of parapsychology, advocating for higher standards of evidence and theoretical development.

This issue of The Journal of Scientific Exploration, Volume 1, Number 2, dated July 1987, critically examines the field of parapsychology. The cover headline, 'Is Parapsychology Scientific? A Critical Examination of the Field,' sets the tone for a deep dive into the methodologies, interpretations, and underlying assumptions of parapsychological research. The price was $5.00.

Issue #4: IS THERE CRITICISM WITHIN PARAPSYCHOLOGY?

The author addresses Dr. Palmer's review, clarifying that their point was not that parapsychology lacks criticism, but rather that leading parapsychologists disagree among themselves. Some are highly critical, while others accept certain phenomena. The author argues that criticism within the field often tends to be based on personal beliefs about what phenomena are real and which are not, rather than on objective criteria.

Issue #5: THE EXPERIMENTER EFFECT.

This section tackles the concept of the 'experimenter effect,' where the failure of skeptics to replicate parapsychological experiments is sometimes explained by the experimenter's influence. The author quotes an editorial from the September 1938 Journal of Parapsychology, which noted that the mere possibility of the experimenter influencing results could undermine claims of proof for ESP. Dr. Palmer is quoted as suggesting that parapsychologists offer "psi" explanations for this effect, positing that the experimenter's own psi is responsible for the results, especially if they are a "believer."

The author expresses astonishment that Dr. Palmer criticizes their argument about the experimenter effect explaining away replication failures, only to then present the 'experimenter psi' hypothesis as a valid explanation. The author feels Dr. Palmer is essentially saying what they said, but reacted negatively when they stated it. Dr. Palmer's concluding remark that the solution to the experimenter effect problem is "research, not rhetoric" is agreed upon, with a call for more empirical research in this area.

Issue #6: DO PARAPSYCHOLOGISTS IGNORE "NORMAL" EXPLANATIONS?

Dr. Palmer agrees that parapsychologists often do not bring up competing normal explanations in their discussion sections. The author implies that this is a significant failing, suggesting that researchers are too certain of their own ability and lack of bias to consider alternative explanations, which Dr. Palmer himself seems to acknowledge.

Issue #7: AD HOMINEM ATTACKS

The author addresses accusations of "McCarthyism" leveled by Dr. Palmer. The author clarifies that their concern is not about firing people but about the potential for bias. The author cites a source regarding Hal Puthoff's affiliation with Scientology, which Dr. Palmer questioned. The author also references John Wilhelm's book, 'The Search for Superman,' which noted a number of practicing Scientologists at SRI involved in parapsychological work, though Wilhelm found no evidence of a conspiracy to subvert results.

The author notes that Dr. Palmer's remarks about the author and another individual, Romm, contain ad hominem elements, questioning Romm's academic specialty and calling her article's qualification "arrogance."

Issue #8: ONESIDEDNESS OF PSI ARTICLES.

The author states that parapsychological articles rarely reference skeptical viewpoints, unlike skeptically written books. The author feels that the writer's position is less important than the extent to which they inform the reader about opposing views and sources for further reading. The author concludes that skeptical literature is more balanced in this regard.

Issue #9: PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND THE MEDIA

Dr. Palmer does not effectively challenge the author's points about parapsychology and the media. The author agrees that parapsychologists may be more concerned about media misrepresentations than they are aware of. The author also notes Dr. Palmer's assertion that parapsychologists are less resistant to occult ideas due to their dependence on public support, which can be partisan.

Issue #10: WHAT CONSTITUTES EVIDENCE FOR PSI?

The author expresses disappointment with Dr. Palmer's interpretation of their book, particularly the critique of their "tortuous exercise in elementary logic" regarding statistical evidence. The author clarifies that their point was that statistical evidence alone is not proof of anything, and that parapsychologists' reliance on the classical hypothesis-testing model leads them to focus on rejecting null hypotheses rather than on the magnitude or power of the test.

The author criticizes the way this model is used in psychology, leading to a "slavish devotion to the size of significance." The author argues that a p-value indicating extreme unlikelihood of a chance origin does not automatically validate an ESP hypothesis, as other factors could be involved. The author also disputes Dr. Palmer's claim that the "psi-hypothesis" is unfalsifiable, stating it is falsified when results conform to expected chance distributions.

Issue #11: THE PSI CONSTRUCT

Dr. Palmer's definition of psi is described as "curious," equating it to a statistically significant departure from chance. The author argues that this definition makes it easier to argue that psi exists. The author contrasts this with the explanations offered by parapsychologists and skeptics, with the former suggesting new principles and the latter suggesting experimental or statistical artifacts. The author hopes Palmer will stick to this definition, as it makes concepts like "miracle-workers" and "key-benders" difficult to fit.

Issue #12: BUNDLE OF STICKS

The author acknowledges running out of energy but addresses Dr. Palmer's use of their article on critical belief as an example. The author argues that Dr. Palmer missed the point about construct validity, questioning how one knows that a scale measuring critical thinking actually does so. The author admits their own study could be criticized but emphasizes that it does not claim to demonstrate new powers or mind-forces, thus its potential incorrectness has less damaging implications than claims about phenomena like the soul leaving the body.

The author expresses surprise at Dr. Palmer defending the "Tart out-of-body (OBE) study," which they believe has serious methodological flaws, including the possibility of cheating and the author admitting to dozing off. The author argues that such a study, marred by flaws, cannot be taken seriously, likening it to a "bundle of sticks" approach where weak studies are aggregated without regard for their individual merit.

Issue #13: METAPHYSICS

Science is described as a "cauldron of competing theories" that helps protect against self-delusion. Criticism is deemed essential for truth to emerge. The author regrets a sentence in their book that implied a strong bias against religion, stating respect for religious beliefs and their positive influence, but also noting their potential to push people to extremes. The author argues against being dogmatic and states intolerance for those who claim scientific authority while rewriting its rules to suit their agenda.

Issue #14: DOES PSI CONTRADICT SCIENCE?

The author's view is that psi either exists or it does not. If it exists, then science denying it is incomplete. If it does not, then much effort is wasted. The author calls for agreement on criteria for when to abandon the quest for psi, criticizing the tendency to proselytize and attract new believers. The author disputes Dr. Palmer's conclusion that modern parapsychology is more influenced by quantum mechanics than magic, suggesting that parapsychologists use quantum paradoxes to make psi seem compatible with mainstream science. The author questions the relevance of quantum mechanics to macro-level behavior and suggests that explanations for phenomena like levitation might also be sought in quantum mechanics.

The author states there is "no justification for censorship" and that parapsychologists have the right to bring their ideas into scientific debate, but must be prepared for criticism. The author doubts that the evidence presented to date supports the existence of psi. The author feels Dr. Palmer implies they are unwilling to consider new evidence, but states the onus is on parapsychologists to present it and "clean up their act."

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this issue revolve around the scientific validity and methodology of parapsychology. The editorial stance is one of critical skepticism, questioning the rigor of research, the interpretation of results, and the theoretical underpinnings of the field. There is a strong emphasis on the importance of robust scientific methods, including falsifiability, replication, and appropriate statistical analysis. The issue also touches upon the influence of belief systems, the role of the media, and the potential for bias in research. The author advocates for a more rigorous and less self-serving approach to parapsychological inquiry.

Title: Zetetic Scholar
Issue: 11
Date: 1983

This issue of Zetetic Scholar features a lengthy and detailed response by John Palmer to criticisms leveled against parapsychology by Dr. Alcock. Palmer systematically addresses Alcock's arguments, defending the scientific integrity and methodology of parapsychological research.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Palmer begins by expressing disappointment with Dr. Alcock's tone, which he characterizes as dismissive and prone to ad hominem attacks. He challenges Alcock to provide a method for proving the non-existence of psi, arguing that the burden of proof should not solely rest on demonstrating its existence. Palmer critiques the tendency to dismiss phenomena based on a lack of immediate explanation, drawing a parallel to how science has historically accepted new concepts.

He asserts that for parapsychological constructs to gain acceptance, it must be clear that phenomena cannot be reasonably explained by existing scientific frameworks. Palmer uses the example of relativity theory to illustrate how initially counter-intuitive scientific ideas can become accepted through testability and explanatory success.

A REPLY TO DR. ALCOCK

This section is structured as a point-by-point rebuttal to Dr. Alcock's review.

ISSUE 1: MAGIC AND SCIENCE

Palmer challenges Alcock's use of the term "magic" to describe parapsychological beliefs. He posits a hypothetical scenario where a reliable, mathematically defined relationship between mental states and random event generator behavior is established. Palmer argues that even without a known causal chain, such a phenomenon, if testable and predictive, would qualify as science, regardless of its seemingly "magical" nature. He suggests that the distinction between magic and science is not as absolute as Alcock implies.

ISSUE 2: PROCESS-ORIENTED RESEARCH

Palmer disputes Alcock's claim that the bulk of parapsychological literature focuses solely on demonstrating the existence of psi. He points out that Alcock himself acknowledges researchers shifting focus to exploring psi's characteristics. Palmer argues that Alcock's selection of references distorts the nature of modern parapsychological research, presenting it as a series of "mindless attempts at miracle-mongering" rather than a field with rigorous experimental designs and a focus on understanding processes and limitations.

ISSUE 3: QUANTUM PHYSICS

Palmer defends his suggestion that quantum physics might be relevant to parapsychology. He clarifies that he was not proposing a "quantum theory" of psi but using quantum physics as a heuristic device to inspire models for parapsychological data. He criticizes Alcock for quoting him out of context, implying he was trying to explain "key-bending" quantum-mechanically. Palmer emphasizes that quantum physics' value lies in inspiring sophisticated models and conceptions, not in providing an immediate explanation or an "ally" against critics.

ISSUE 4: CRITICISM WITHIN PARAPSYCHOLOGY

Palmer addresses Alcock's comments on criticism within the field, clarifying that his original point was not that parapsychology lacks criticism, but that Alcock denied "topic-specific criticism."

ISSUE 5: THE EXPERIMENTER EFFECT

Palmer distinguishes between simply stating that experimenters who cannot get results are not psi-conducive and acknowledging the replicability problem implied by the experimenter effect (EE). He argues that the latter, which involves developing testable hypotheses and testing them, is the scientific approach that most parapsychologists follow. He also notes that evidence suggests experimenter attitudes can correlate with psi outcomes, but this is not an established fact.

ISSUE 6: IGNORING "NORMAL" INTERPRETATIONS

Palmer defends his argument that formal control conditions might not always be the most appropriate way to deal with experimental artifacts. He states that researchers are responsible for addressing potential artifacts they are aware of, and that the assumption of omniscience is not implied by the omission of a pro forma disclaimer about other interpretations.

ISSUE 7: AD-HOMINEM ATTACKS

Palmer criticizes Alcock for playing "fast and loose with the facts," specifically regarding his reference to Puthoff's alleged involvement with Scientology. Palmer argues that Alcock's claim is not supported by the cited evidence and that such undocumented presumptions are inappropriate when a professional reputation is at stake. He finds Alcock's insensitivity to this error distressing.

ISSUE 8: LITERATURE BIAS

Palmer briefly dismisses Alcock's use of a reading list as proof of objectivity, suggesting it is a superficial argument.

ISSUE 10: STATISTICS AND FALSIFIABILITY

Palmer finds Alcock's discussion of statistics and falsifiability muddled. He clarifies his position that parapsychologists accept an ESP hypothesis only when a chance model is appropriately rejected and reasonable precautions are taken. He argues that Alcock's challenge for a test to demonstrate that psi does not exist is contradictory, as Alcock himself later states it is impossible. Palmer defends the falsifiability of the psi hypothesis, stating that an investigator sets up a test, predicts an outcome, and if it fails, concludes the hypothesis is falsified, acknowledging limitations and generality.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The Zetetic Scholar, as evidenced by this issue, appears to provide a platform for detailed, critical engagement with skeptical viewpoints on parapsychology. The editorial stance, as represented by Palmer's response, is one of defending the scientific legitimacy of parapsychological research, advocating for rigorous methodology, and challenging what are perceived as biased or fallacious arguments from skeptics. The journal seems to encourage open debate and the exploration of theoretical frameworks, even those that are unconventional.

This issue of Zetetic Scholar, dated 1983, features a concluding debate between Dr. Alcock and Dr. Palmer on the topic of parapsychology, scientific methodology, and the nature of open inquiry. It also includes a comprehensive bibliography on the phenomenon of fire-walking.

Debate on Parapsychology: Alcock vs. Palmer

The core of the issue revolves around a heated exchange concerning the validity and evaluation of parapsychological research. Dr. Alcock, a prominent skeptic, is criticized by Dr. Palmer for his dismissive approach and for employing rhetorical tactics that he argues could be used against any social science experiment.

Alcock's Stance on Psi Evidence

Dr. Alcock's position, as presented by Palmer, is that there is no evidence for psi, and that experiments claiming to show psi phenomena suffer from "serious methodological flaws." Palmer notes that Alcock concedes that the "experimenter psi hypothesis" can never be conclusively disproven but argues that if predictions based on it are consistently falsified, it would eventually be abandoned, as is typical in science.

Palmer challenges Alcock's claim that leaving subjects alone in a room with a target is not standard procedure in ESP research, stating this is incorrect. He also criticizes Alcock's assertion that any conceivable alternate explanation is sufficient to render an experiment worthless, calling this position unfalsifiable.

Palmer's Defense of Open Inquiry

Dr. Palmer defends the legitimacy of open-minded inquiry into psi anomalies within the scientific community. He charges that Dr. Alcock opposes such inquiry by dismissing any conceptualizations of psi phenomena that do not align with his mechanistic-materialistic worldview as pseudo-scientific. Palmer argues that simply allowing "cranks to have their say" is not a substitute for legitimizing open inquiry.

Palmer counters Alcock's claim of not being opposed to the study of psi by stating that Alcock's book clearly indicates he feels the time has come to stop investigating psi, equating the evidence for psi with that for Santa Claus. Palmer questions whether Alcock would favor scientific inquiry into Santa Claus.

Criteria for Deciding on Psi Research

Dr. Alcock poses the question: "By what criteria might we be able to decide that the likelihood of the existence of psi is too low to bother about?" Palmer responds by framing the issue not as "psi exists" versus "psi does not exist," but as two sets of explanations for putative anomalies: "normal" explanations (trivial applications of known laws) and "paranormal" explanations (new laws or extensions of known laws). The competition should continue until one camp achieves a compelling explanation, with the burden of proof still on psi proponents.

Palmer acknowledges that no paranormal explanations have achieved this stature but disagrees with Alcock's assessment of normal explanations. He describes skeptical counter-interpretations as "ad hoc and often far-fetched" and lacking critical testing. He contrasts this with cases like "vision" in bats, where a strong normal explanation rendered paranormal explanations superfluous.

Tone and Rhetoric

An addendum addresses the tone of the debate. Dr. Alcock was offended by Palmer's paper, but Palmer argues that Alcock's own rhetoric provoked the tone. Palmer defends his "highly polemical, extremely arrogant, and completely destructive" approach as a justified response to Alcock's characterization of researchers as "fanatical occultists masquerading as scientists" and his use of selective editing and journalistic devices.

Bibliography on Fire-Walking

The issue concludes with an extensive bibliography on fire-walking, compiled by Marcello Truzzi. This section lists numerous articles, books, and papers from various journals and publications, spanning historical accounts, scientific investigations, and cultural studies of the phenomenon.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this issue are the rigorous evaluation of scientific evidence, the nature of skepticism versus open-mindedness in scientific inquiry, and the specific debate surrounding parapsychology. The editorial stance, as represented by Dr. Palmer's contributions, appears to favor continued, disciplined investigation into anomalous phenomena, while critiquing what it perceives as overly dismissive or biased skepticism. The inclusion of the fire-walking bibliography suggests an interest in exploring diverse and often unexplained phenomena.

This document is a reply by Ron Westrum to commentators on his essay "Crypto-Science and Social Intelligence About Anomalies." The essay was originally prepared for a conference on the demarcation between science and pseudo-science at Virginia Tech. Westrum addresses criticisms and elaborates on his points, emphasizing the role of logistic support, the sociology of anomalous events, and the relationship between crypto-science and "official reality."

Westrum's Core Arguments

Westrum reiterates three main points from his original essay:

1. Lack of Logistic Support: The often sub-standard research in crypto-sciences is frequently a result of insufficient logistic support, not necessarily an excuse for sloppy work, but a comment on the input-output relationship.
2. Attitude Toward Objects of Study: The lack of progress in some areas of crypto-science may be due to inadequate support rather than the intractability or non-existence of the objects studied. UFO investigations are considered low priority by the scientific community.
3. Hostility Toward Researchers: There appears to be an unnecessary current of hostility toward researchers in crypto-sciences, which Westrum suggests might stem from the threat such activities pose to officially sanctioned "reality."

Defining Crypto-Science and Crypto-Scientists

Westrum proposes a definition for a "crypto-scientist" (CS) as anyone who studies anomalous events with the aim of bringing them within the circle of scientific understanding. This is contrasted with "mystery-mongering." He argues that CSs are interested in systematic data and alternative explanations, refuting the idea that "pseudosciences" do not generate anomalous data within their own conceptual context. He cites examples like the Corliss Sourcebooks, Heuvelmans's "In the Wake of the Sea-Serpents," and Hendry's "UFO Handbook" as evidence of data compilation and refinement in crypto-science.

Anomalous Topics and Taboo Subjects

Westrum agrees with commentators Robert Rosenthal and H.J. Eysenck that topics which are both anomalous and taboo are likely to have the most problems. He notes that while many anomalies are popular with the public, "official reality" determines legitimacy, scientific recognition, and funding. Most anomalists desire legitimacy and at least minimal courtesy from scientists, even if this expectation is unrealistic.

The Role of Humor and Perceived Hostility

Responding to Dan Cohen's suggestion that anomalists lack a sense of humor, Westrum acknowledges that they might seem funny to outsiders but attributes this to feeling constantly under attack. He believes that removing the hostility from the scientific community would help CSs laugh at themselves more easily. He also mentions Morris Goran's underestimation of CS humor, referencing a joke about Galileo and Semmelweiss that elicited laughter.

Critiques of "Nonsense" and the Value of Crypto-Science

Westrum addresses the "nonsense" associated with beliefs about anomalies, like biorhythms and astrology, acknowledging that crypto-scientists are often unfairly lumped with charlatans like Van Daniken. He argues that crypto-scientists are needed to draw attention to and collate reports of events that would otherwise remain hidden. He provides examples:

• Ball lightning: Initially described as rare, surveys showed it was not.
• UFO sightings: Only about one in eight UFO sighters report their sightings, with private investigation becoming the sole source after 1968.
• Spontaneous Human Combustion (SHC): Few cases are reported in medical literature, though physicians may observe them without documenting.
• Battered Child Syndrome: Its existence was largely unsuspected but became known through compulsory reporting.

He asserts that anomalous events are often kept secret, citing that UFO reporting rates among scientists are only slightly higher than the general public's. The "report release" effect, where publication of anomalous reports leads to more people coming forward, is also mentioned.

Contribution of Crypto-Scientists

Westrum disagrees with Patrick Grim's view that crypto-science is useless. He argues that while crypto-science may not establish the nature of anomalies (which would then fall to ordinary science disciplines), the collected data can be extremely valuable for guiding inquiry. He likens the crypto-scientist to an explorer bringing back a specimen for a zoologist.

He differentiates "amateur science" in established fields from "amateur science" in crypto areas. In crypto-science, the balance of power may initially shift toward amateurs, but professionals are likely to gain influence over time. He expresses concern about new scientist professionals setting up organizations with stringent membership criteria that could exclude long-time researchers.

Sociology and Scientific Investigation

Westrum defends the contribution of sociology to scientific investigation, particularly in basic science areas. He argues that while philosophers of science might supply normative principles, sociology can help understand progress in basic scientific research by studying the productivity of research groups and social configurations. He believes that a healthy scientific institution utilizes the "human factor" for maximal creativity.

Applying this to crypto-science, he questions whether successful crypto groups have relationships with the scientific community that contribute to their health and productivity. He suggests that co-operative efforts could help clarify puzzling phenomena, while isolation might negatively affect productivity.

The UFO Problem and Sociological Matters

Westrum notes that the "UFO problem" is not clearly the responsibility of any single academic or governmental body. He argues that a static division of scientific labor may prevent society from responding creatively to new challenges, such as the possibility of extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI).

He discusses the difficulty in predicting the behavior of intelligent organisms, comparing UFOlogy to Kremlinology rather than physics due to the potential for strategic deception. He also critiques the "they can't get here" and "absence of extraterrestrials on earth" arguments as anthropomorphic.

Respectability and Treatment of Crypto-Scientists

Westrum emphasizes the importance of respectability, noting how elites in the scientific community determine the status of ideas and people. He argues that while "in the long run" correct ideas may succeed, for those involved in crypto-science, neglect and ridicule are painful. He believes that treating crypto-scientists as charlatans is a gross injustice, as their work, though potentially slow and inadequate, is rarely knowingly fraudulent.

He suggests that the prosecution of crypto-scientists encourages scientists to be sloppy by creating dual standards. He calls for crypto-science to be treated in a friendly manner, neither lumped with pseudo-science nor persecuted, acknowledging that sloppiness and fraud might occur but are less likely if CSs received more acceptance.

"Reality" and Anomalous Experiences

Westrum concludes by discussing the concept of "reality," agreeing that his use of the term might be closer to Robin Williams's "Reality...What A Concept" than a philosophical definition. He argues that what a group takes to be real is bound up with cognitive and emotional interests, making anomalies taboo. Arguments over anomalies are not just academic but involve "gut issues" about knowledge, authority, and the unknown. He uses the example of finding a Coelacanth and the disturbance when a solid edifice of knowledge is invaded by a deviant experience. He notes that people invest emotions in their beliefs and that disagreements over what experiences are real can lead to trouble, citing examples like lake monsters and the Yakima Indian Reservation.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this issue revolve around the demarcation between science and crypto-science, the sociology of scientific communities, the challenges of studying anomalous phenomena, and the importance of a balanced and tolerant approach to unconventional research. Westrum's stance is one of advocating for the legitimacy and value of crypto-science, while also acknowledging the need for rigorous methodology and distinguishing it from outright fraud. He calls for greater acceptance and support for crypto-scientists from the broader scientific community, arguing that such an approach benefits not only those studying anomalies but also the scientific enterprise as a whole by fostering creativity and addressing challenging questions about reality.

This issue of Zetetic Scholar, identified as issue #11 from 1983, focuses on anomalous phenomena, particularly those reported on the Yakima Indian Nation, and explores the nature of scientific inquiry into such subjects. The magazine features articles discussing the investigation of UFO sightings and other unusual events, the theoretical frameworks for studying anomalies, and recommendations for the future practice of parapsychology.

Anomalous Events on the Yakima Indian Nation

The issue details an investigation into reports from the Yakima Indian Nation, where the author spent two weeks interviewing approximately two dozen individuals, including fire lookouts. These interviews revealed a range of experiences, from subjective to objective, including photographs taken by a fire control officer and an engineer from the Center for UFO Studies. The author notes the reservation appears to be a "crypto-scientist's paradise." Michael Persinger is cited as suggesting that anomalous physical events, possibly linked to seismic activity, could explain phenomena like balls of lights and UFOs. The article questions whether "drunken Indians" are responsible, dismissing this as a simplistic explanation for the high rate of reported UFO activity.

The text highlights the importance of understanding these phenomena, noting that the "inability (and unwillingness) of current science to explain these experiences has increased the terror of those who experience them." The intervention of the Center for UFO Studies and J. Allen Hynek is credited with recording many events, with data collected by Bill Vogel and David Akers being analyzed by Michael Persinger for links to seismic events.

Crypto-science and Parasciences

The magazine discusses the role of "crypto-science" in exploring phenomena not yet within the scope of mainstream science. It is argued that crypto-scientists perform a useful service by paying attention to evanescent events and gathering data that might otherwise be lost. However, expectations for crypto-science must be reasonable, as it is unlikely to discover new scientific principles, though it may detect phenomena that could lead to such discoveries.

A distinction is made between "cryptosciences" and "parasciences," as defined by Marcello Truzzi. Cryptosciences focus on discrete objects (e.g., UFOs, bigfoot) that could, in theory, be presented as physical evidence. Parasciences, conversely, deal with anomalies inferred from connections between ordinary events (e.g., astrology and athletic performance), where dispute resolution relies on inferences rather than direct proof. The article acknowledges that anomalous observations in both categories are often hidden and that the sociology of science differs between them.

Recommendations for Parapsychology

Gerd H. Hövelmann contributes "Seven Recommendations for the Future Practice of Parapsychology." The first recommendation is for parapsychologists to "instantly give up their revolutionary outlook upon their field and upon themselves." Hövelmann argues that the field, despite claims of being "revolutionary," exhibits many characteristics of orthodox scientific disciplines, including the rigid application of scientific research methods. He contends that parapsychologists cannot simultaneously propagate revolutionary slogans and adhere to established scientific rigor.

Bibliography

The issue includes extensive bibliographies, including a "Random Bibliography on the Occult and the Paranormal" spanning multiple pages, listing numerous academic articles and books relevant to the study of anomalies, belief systems, and related fields. Another section provides "Notes" referencing various publications and conferences pertinent to the topics discussed.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this issue revolve around the investigation of anomalous phenomena, particularly UFOs, and the challenges of integrating such studies into mainstream science. There is a strong emphasis on the need for rigorous scientific methodology, critical analysis, and a move away from sensationalism or unsubstantiated claims. The editorial stance appears to favor a cautious, evidence-based approach to understanding the paranormal, advocating for parapsychology to adopt the standards and practices of established scientific disciplines to gain legitimacy.

This issue of the *Zeitschrift für Parapsychologie und Grenzgebiete der Psychologie*, Volume 25, published in 1983, focuses on critical recommendations for the field of parapsychology. The articles delve into the methodological challenges, the interpretation of results, and the scientific standing of parapsychological research.

Recommendation 1: Paradigm Switches and Revolutionary Science

The author begins by addressing the claim that parapsychology represents a 'paradigm switch' or 'scientific revolution.' It is argued that while scientific endeavors can lead to fundamental changes in concepts, the programmatic decision to revolutionize science is not a valid path to achieving this. Furthermore, the claim to practice 'revolutionary science' is unlikely to favorably dispose members of the scientific community toward accepting parapsychology as a legitimate branch of science.

Recommendation 2: The Survival Hypothesis

Parapsychologists are strongly advised to cease discussing the problem of survival after bodily death. The author contends that the experimental results obtained thus far are too unreliable, ambiguous, and inconsistent to draw firm conclusions. Even conclusions from thanatological investigations or spontaneous phenomena are considered more arbitrary and speculative than those from experimental laboratory tests. Many of these phenomena are open to alternative explanations, including the capabilities of living persons. The author emphasizes that survival cannot be regarded as proven as long as reasonable counter-explanations exist, and there is no foreseeable chance of obtaining conclusive scientific proof in the near future. The principle of Occam's razor is invoked, urging researchers to avoid provoking false hopes and expectations among the public due to poorly founded speculations. The author questions the justification for such practice if it leads to alarming outgrowths of irrational hopes and longings.

Comment on Recommendation 2

If parapsychologists insist on discussing survival, they should provide compelling reasons and clearly state that their opinions are speculative and not evidence-based. Readers should be cautioned to consider these statements with reservations. The author also raises the question of the importance and desirability of investigating the survival problem, questioning whether such knowledge would be useful for vital interests or alleviate mortal dread. The argument that scientists are obliged to find out 'what the destination of man is' is dismissed as a fictitious reason or feigned purpose, highlighting a myth that scientific research is possible without concrete purposes.

It is further postulated that parapsychology should be kept free of ideological speculation on the nature of man, the world, or the universe, or on the meaning of life.

Recommendation 3: Reliance on Personal Evidence and Quasi-Experimental Settings

Parapsychologists should not heavily rely on 'personal evidence' from spontaneous paranormal occurrences or quasi-experimental settings, such as those involving 'psychic-detectives' or 'chair tests.' Stories of spontaneous paranormal occurrences are deemed unreliable for scientific study due to factors like witness trustworthiness, perception accuracy, memory, and the possibility of chance. While case reports might have happened as reported, they lack scientific value as evidence for paranormal phenomena. Even results from quasi-experimental settings are considered open to flaws and over-interpretation, as demonstrated by studies on 'chair tests.' The author suggests that case reports are valuable only for stimulating the invention of novel designs for rigid experimental testing.

Recommendation 4: Standardized Terminology

Parapsychologists should cease pretending that their current terminology is explanatory and instead build up a standardized, methodically constructed terminology. Technical terms like 'psi performance' or 'psi information' are used in a way that suggests explanatory properties, but they are merely descriptive classifications lacking explanatory value. The terms are often poorly specified and can be used at pleasure. To ensure intersubjectivity and verifiability, scientific statements must be understandable and verifiable. A methodical construction of terminology, progressing from basic to peripheral terms, is urgently needed to standardize the linguistic means of the field.

Recommendation 5: Inconsistencies in Experimental Findings

Given the frequent inconsistencies in experimental findings, parapsychologists should not resort to the fatalistic conception that these inconsistencies are constitutive of paranormal events. The author acknowledges that inconsistencies are a notable finding in parapsychology but argues that it is not admissible or logically self-consistent to conclude that they are necessarily inherent to paranormal events. It is unclear whether current methods and conceptualizations are sophisticated enough to allow for watertight explanations. Parapsychologists should not abandon the concept of lawfulness in their field, and some may even be proud of obtaining inconsistent results that do not fit into current scientific conceptions of the world.

Recommendation 6: Collaboration with Critics

Parapsychologists should carefully consider the arguments of critics and collaborate with scientifically-minded individuals whenever possible. The field has a history of internal and external criticism. While some criticisms have been dismissed as invalid, others, like those from Truzzi, Hoebens, and Hyman, have addressed genuine problems in parapsychological research. Scientific criticism is defined as substantiating the request to give up a particular orientation. Parapsychologists should welcome and collaborate with critics who are willing to discuss problems on a scientific level and thoroughly examine evidence before forming judgments. This collaboration has much to potentially gain and nothing to lose.

Recommendation 7: Separation from Pseudoscientific Claimants

Parapsychologists should strictly separate themselves from pseudoscientific claimants who put forward untestable ideas full of supernaturalism and metaphysics and refuse to adopt rigid scientific methods. Despite the use of orthodox scientific research methods in many parapsychological investigations, there is an inclination to flirt with occult or antiscientific ideas. Researchers occasionally show an uncritical tendency to accept questionable pseudoscientific claims, leading critics to reproach parapsychology for lacking critical judgment and intellectual self-discipline. While not advocating avoidance of these organizations or claimants, the author stresses the need to explicitly state whether their arguments are credible, sound, and scientific. Arbitrariness in methods and statements would open the door to pseudoscientific speculation and vulgarization, risking the field's academic integration.

Financial Support and Scientific Commission

Regarding financial support from organizations and private persons, John Beloff's suggestion of a scientific commission is discussed. This commission, directed by a distinguished scientist, would assess valid clues to the existence of psi phenomena. Its activity should extend beyond checking existing evidence to financially supporting promising empirical data. Installation in cooperation with the Parapsychological Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science is proposed. While acknowledging potential problems with realization, the author believes they are solvable. The commission's conclusions would significantly influence the 'scientific community's' attitude toward parapsychology and its funding.

Science vs. Pseudoscience and the Occult

The author reiterates the importance of adhering to the methods and methodological standards of orthodox science, even if these methods are not perfect. To be recognized as scientists, parapsychologists must use these standards. The field should not return to hermetic contemplation, which may offer a satisfying picture of psi but does not constitute a scientific endeavor. Whether science is viewed as the most recommendable way to approach truth or as just another ideology, adherence to scientific methods is necessary for substantiating claims of scientific research.

Notes and References

The issue includes extensive notes and references, citing numerous works on parapsychology, scientific methodology, and related philosophical concepts. These references support the arguments made throughout the recommendations and comments, providing a scholarly basis for the critique and suggestions presented.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this issue revolve around the need for rigor, objectivity, and adherence to scientific standards within parapsychology. The editorial stance is critical yet constructive, aiming to elevate the field's scientific credibility by addressing its methodological weaknesses, conceptual ambiguities, and its relationship with pseudoscience and the occult. There is a strong emphasis on distinguishing between empirical evidence and speculative interpretation, and on fostering a more self-critical and collaborative approach within the parapsychological community.

This issue of Zetetic Scholar, identified as issue #11 from 1983, features a collection of critical commentaries on recommendations put forth by Gerd Hövelmann. The main cover headline is "CRITICAL COMMENTARIES:" with specific comments by John Beloff highlighted.

Commentary by John Beloff

John Beloff begins by agreeing with Gerd Hövelmann that parapsychologists must strive for seriousness in the eyes of the scientific community to secure funding and resources. He supports Hövelmann's suggestion for an official Commission of Enquiry but questions whether Hövelmann's recommended strategies would achieve the desired effect. Beloff expresses doubt, particularly regarding Hövelmann's second recommendation (R2), which suggests that current experimental results are too unreliable and ambiguous. Beloff highlights Hövelmann's own admission that "repeatability of parapsychological experiments is impossible to obtain for theoretical reasons." He criticizes Hövelmann's call to renounce thanatological concerns and spontaneous real-life incidents, finding these recommendations embody serious misconceptions.

Beloff challenges Hövelmann's assertion that survival cannot be regarded as proven as long as alternative explanations exist, arguing that survival is merely a hypothesis. He questions whether any scientific hypothesis can be proven to exclude all alternative explanations. While personally unconvinced by the survival hypothesis, Beloff respects scholars like Ian Stevenson and Alan Gauld who consider it the most plausible interpretation and opposes suppressing speculation in this area. He also critiques Hövelmann's dismissal of thousands of case reports as having "without any value" as evidence, pointing out that in legal contexts, direct testimony is superior to circumstantial evidence.

Beloff agrees with Hövelmann's first recommendation (R1) that scientific revolutions are driven by discoveries that upset paradigms, not by those with radical credentials. However, he doubts parapsychology's ability to achieve this and believes it operates in a different realm than physics, focusing on the mind rather than matter. He sees parapsychology as a challenge to materialism. Regarding Hövelmann's fourth recommendation (R4) on terminology, Beloff finds it obscure, questioning the meaning of a "methodically constructed" terminology. He argues that current terms, while imperfect, are theoretically uncommitted and that labeling an event as 'psi' implies it cannot be explained by known physical theories.

Beloff concludes by stating his agreement with Hövelmann's objectives while disagreeing with specific recommendations, particularly those that might suppress important areas of research or lead to the abandonment of potentially significant phenomena.

Commentary by Susan J. Blackmore

Susan J. Blackmore found Hövelmann's recommendations thought-provoking, agreeing with some and disagreeing with others. She wholeheartedly endorses the suggestion to stop calling parapsychologists "revolutionaries," distinguishing between demanding a revolution and creating one. She notes that while Hövelmann implies nothing in parapsychology is revolutionary, observational theories might be, requiring new ways of looking at causation. Blackmore cautions against adopting a revolutionary stance, as it can obscure the "real poverty of much of parapsychology" and tempt others into the field under false pretenses.

Blackmore strongly disagrees with the recommendation to "leave off" commenting on the question of survival after death, noting its historical importance to psychical research. She acknowledges that survival evidence is speculative but argues this is no reason to abandon the enterprise. She believes that alternative explanations do not necessarily render an idea invalid and that both 'psi' and 'survival' explanations are speculative and primitive compared to established scientific theories.

Blackmore proposes a new recommendation: instead of chasing the negatively defined "paranormal," parapsychology should understand its phenomena regardless of the explanation. She suggests this approach, applied to research on Out-of-Body Experiences (OBEs), could lead to new avenues of research that might move beyond the traditional paranormal. She warns that if parapsychologists remain stuck in outdated programs, others will forge ahead. She extends this argument to phenomena like NDEs and poltergeists, suggesting that "anomalistic psychology" might be a more productive framework for studying experiences claimed to be paranormal.

Commentary by H.J. Eysenck

H.J. Eysenck finds Hövelmann's recommendations generally reasonable but notes some require clarification. He focuses on the fourth recommendation, regarding descriptive terminology, and links it to the philosophical problem of causality, referencing David Hume. Eysenck questions how terms like "gravitation" truly explain phenomena, noting the lack of a single agreed-upon theory and the existence of competing explanations (Newtonian, quantum mechanics). He argues that current terminology in parapsychology, like in physics, is often descriptive rather than explanatory.

Eysenck addresses Hövelmann's fifth recommendation, concerning experimental inconsistencies. He agrees that these inconsistencies should not be seen as necessarily constitutive of paranormal events, suggesting they often arise from unknown parameters or individual differences in response to experiments (e.g., extraversion, interest level, fatigue). He believes parapsychology may not yet be sophisticated enough for "water-tight explanations" but argues that this is also true for psychological and physical systems. He disputes Hövelmann's suggestion that parapsychologists "overhastily abandon the concept of lawfulness," stating they are searching for it amidst complexity.

Regarding Hövelmann's first recommendation on revolutionary science, Eysenck notes that Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler were revolutionary in their findings but orthodox in their methods. He believes parapsychologists are forced into a revolutionary role by their data, not by a programmatic decision. He sees no contradiction in being revolutionary in findings while applying orthodox scientific methods.

Commentary by Piet Hein Hoebens

Piet Hein Hoebens introduces Gerd Hövelmann's recommendations as iconoclastic within the German psi-scene, contrasting them with the established "Benderian Credo" which posits the existence of psi, dismisses doubters, values qualitative evidence, and sees psi as revolutionary and an antidote to materialism. Hoebens finds himself in basic agreement with Hövelmann but offers marginal comments.

He clarifies Hövelmann's first recommendation, suggesting that while emphasizing revolutionary implications of psi is fine, it should not be used to excuse shortcomings in modern parapsychology. For the second recommendation, Hoebens disagrees with Hövelmann's strong feelings against survival claims, arguing that while evidence is weak, it shouldn't be dismissed entirely. He likens the situation to how 'psi' itself is speculative and primitive.

Hoebens applauds Hövelmann's call for cooperation between proponents and critics (Recommendation 6) but cautions against restricting tolerance only to critics deemed "friendly." He defends Professor Hansel's critique as important and relevant, urging parapsychologists not to ignore it, nor the criticisms of Gardner and Randi.

Regarding Recommendation 7, Hoebens suspects it aims to provoke critics like those associated with Esotera magazine. He understands the desire to distance from "crackpots" but warns against arguments backfiring. He questions the testability of psi itself, noting that failure to find evidence doesn't prove nonexistence. He suggests an amended recommendation: parapsychologists should dissociate themselves from claimants who appeal to a "Higher Sort of Science" to demand acceptance regardless of evidence.

Hoebens expresses skepticism about John Beloff's proposal for a scientific committee, predicting it would lead to further controversy. He concludes by finding little to disagree with in Hövelmann's recommendations, which he trusts will confirm Professor Bender's suspicions.

Commentary by Brian Inglis

Brian Inglis reviews Hövelmann's recommendations one by one:

1. He agrees that one can be revolutionary and scientific simultaneously, citing Einstein and quantum physicists. The issue arises when parapsychology's findings subvert scientific method, as with ESP bypassing controls or psychokinesis (PK) being more drastic.
2. Inglis argues that while survival evidence shouldn't be presented as proof, it's absurd to suggest it shouldn't be presented at all.
3. He criticizes the argument that anecdotal evidence is inadmissible as a "behaviorist eccentricity" that has damaged research, comparing it to studying marriage without acknowledging love.
4. Inglis notes that concepts like magnetism and 'psi' are conveniences, not explanations, and that their nature is not fully understood.
5. He suggests that consistent inconsistencies, like the decline effect, can be seen as accompaniments of psi, not proof of it.
6. He finds that the call for open-minded psychologists (Recommendation 6) often fails in practice, as they tend to find flaws retrospectively.
7. Inglis questions where parapsychology ends and "parapornography" begins, noting that some phenomena like physical mediumship, poltergeists, and UFOs are often repudiated. He recalls that the reality of the mesmeric or hypnotic trance state was rejected for over a century.

Inglis summarizes that parapsychologists should use accepted scientific methodology to convince scientists of psi's reality but must not let skeptics impose restrictive regulations that ignore known facts.

Commentary by Jurgen Keil

Jurgen Keil expresses "Some Doubts about the Hövelmann Recommendations." He finds them reasonable on the surface but requiring closer scrutiny. Keil identifies a difficulty in Hövelmann's unclear distinction between strategies aimed at impressing specific groups (scientists reading Science, Skeptical Inquirer, Zetetic Scholar) and those aligned with scientific methodology. He illustrates this with an example of PK research that might be rejected based on the former but justified by the latter.

Keil agrees that science is a social activity influenced by expectations, making strategy (1) important. However, he warns that prioritizing strategy (1) can lead to rationalization and discourage promising research. He emphasizes that hopes and expectations tied to strategy (2) must be evaluated against potential negative reactions from strategy (1). He notes that these evaluations are subjective and lack universally accepted criteria.

Keil observes that Hövelmann seems interested in creating a favorable impression among scientists, suggesting an operational definition of science. However, he also rejects widely held scientific views when arguing that research must have a concrete purpose. Keil concludes that Hövelmann's recommendations, while seemingly reasonable, raise complex issues regarding the definition and practice of science in parapsychology.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring theme throughout these commentaries is the tension between achieving scientific credibility and maintaining the integrity and scope of parapsychological research. Commentators grapple with Hövelmann's recommendations, which largely advocate for a more conservative, methodologically rigorous, and less speculative approach to parapsychology. Key debates revolve around:

• Scientific Rigor vs. Scope of Research: The need for strict methodology and reliable evidence is acknowledged, but several commentators caution against abandoning potentially valuable areas like survival research or anecdotal evidence, fearing it would narrow the field excessively.
• Revolutionary Stance: The idea of parapsychology as a revolutionary science is debated, with some arguing it's a forced role due to its findings, while others caution against using it as an excuse for poor methodology or to obscure a lack of progress.
• Terminology and Explanation: The use of descriptive versus explanatory terminology, and the philosophical implications of causality, are discussed in relation to scientific explanation.
• Collaboration with Critics: There is general agreement on the need to engage with critics, but also a warning against being overly restrictive or dismissing unconventional ideas too readily.
• The Nature of Science: The commentaries touch upon what constitutes science, whether it's purely methodological or also influenced by social factors and expectations.

The overall stance of the commentaries is critical but constructive, engaging deeply with Hövelmann's proposals. While many agree with the general aim of improving parapsychology's standing, they offer nuanced perspectives and raise important counterarguments, highlighting the complexities and ongoing debates within the field.

This issue of Parapsychology, identified by page numbers 150-158 and likely from Volume 3 in 1983, features a series of commentaries by prominent figures in the field on the recommendations put forth by Gerd H. Hövelmann regarding the future of parapsychology. The primary contributors include Stanley Krippner, Morton Leeds, Walter V. Lucadou, and Gerald C. Mertens, each offering their perspectives on Hövelmann's suggestions.

Commentary on Hövelmann's Recommendations

Stanley Krippner begins by acknowledging the value in Hövelmann's recommendations, noting that while many points have been raised before, Hövelmann has organized them effectively. Krippner reacts to specific recommendations:

• (H1) Scientific Revolution: Krippner agrees that parapsychological research might lead to a "scientific revolution" in the Kuhnian sense. He expresses a preference for parapsychologists to focus more on cooperation with orthodox science rather than emphasizing revolution, though he acknowledges the adoption of orthodox scientific methodology by parapsychologists for investigating unorthodox subjects.
• (H2) Interpretation of Findings: Krippner believes scientists have a responsibility to be cautious in interpreting findings but also to be open about their research and its potential wider implications. He argues that secrecy or refusal to link experimental results to broader life questions can lead to confusion. He disputes the notion that people necessarily hope for life after death, stating that while he personally finds survival of bodily death unlikely, he recognizes that perceptions of what is reasonable depend on community and definitions.
• (H3) Criticism by Hoebens: Krippner agrees with Hövelmann regarding criticism but finds it difficult to evaluate Hoebens' critique due to the historical distance of the events. He suggests Hoebens should apply similar scrutiny to orthodox psychological claims. Krippner also defends the strategy of investigating spontaneous cases, arguing that it avoids laboratory distortions and can yield high research standards with modern equipment.
• (H4) Terminology: Krippner agrees that the terms used in parapsychology are not ideal and notes that East-European terms have not gained traction in the West. He sees a need for public communication but believes new terms might gain acceptance as research advances.
• (H6) External Criticism: Krippner agrees that useful criticism comes from within the field and that parapsychologists should heed reasonable external critics. However, he cautions that responding to criticism can become a public relations exercise rather than a genuine discussion for improving research. He stresses the need for parapsychologists to balance responding to criticism with the time and energy required for actual research.

Morton Leeds addresses Hövelmann's recommendations with six points:

1. Abandon the Revolutionary Outlook: Leeds distinguishes between revolutionary outlook, means, and implications. He agrees that the outlook should be abandoned, as the field utilizes current scientific methodology, and the implications, while potentially revolutionary, are secondary to valid methodology.
2. Drop the Problem of Survival After Death: Leeds agrees it's early to tackle this issue, but argues that all issues remain legitimate for scientific examination, including survival. He cautions against creating automatic exclusions based on current ignorance.
3. Do Not Rely Too Heavily on Personal Evidence: Leeds notes that interesting material often comes from personal experiences, which drive the field. He believes time and the scientific approach will eventually lead to a more standardized understanding.
4. Build Up Standardized Terminology: Leeds observes that this is already happening, with terminology becoming more uniform, especially among English-speaking researchers.
5. Don't Assume Paranormal Phenomena with Inconsistent Findings: Leeds states that inconsistency is a property of models, not phenomena, and that such inconsistencies indicate a flawed model or presupposition.
6. Consider Critics and Collaborate: Leeds suggests that Hövelmann has chosen to ignore literature that answers critics, noting that much researcher energy is spent on responding to criticism.

Leeds also adds a seventh point: Parapsychologists should separate themselves from pseudoscientists. He acknowledges the difficulty but states that parapsychologists are doing the right thing by doggedly pursuing their theories with scientific techniques. He believes slow, steady growth is the best process, rather than commissions.

Walter V. Lucadou expresses initial agreement with Hövelmann's recommendations but later worries about their practical utility. He believes that while scientists will recognize the intentions, those feeling criticized might find loopholes. Lucadou doubts the usefulness of such philosophical recommendations for scientific evolution, noting that successful scientists often ignore philosophers of science. He highlights the importance of unwritten social rules in science, which are often disregarded in parapsychology, where gossip and backstage information play a significant role. Despite this, he is in basic agreement with Hövelmann and offers comments to improve his arguments.

Lucadou's numbered responses to Hövelmann's points (Ad 1, Ad 2, Ad 4, Ad 5, Ad 7) elaborate on these themes:

• Ad 1 (Revolutionary Outlook): Parapsychology investigates anomalies, and if existing theories explain them, it's not revolutionary. A new theory might be, but not the phenomena themselves.
• Ad 2 (Survival After Death): It's legitimate to ask about survival, but the data is ambiguous, making it potentially fruitless. Solving other psi problems first is more economical.
• Ad 4 (Phenomenological Models): Psi doesn't explain anything, but anomalies can be described by other anomalies using phenomenological models, which can reveal relationships.
• Ad 5 (Inconsistent Results): Inconsistency relates to models, not phenomena. It indicates a flawed model or presupposition, such as the underlying assumption of "information transfer" in ESP experiments. New concepts can explain inconsistencies without abandoning lawfulness.
• Ad 7 (Commissions): Lucadou doubts that commissions like the one suggested by John Beloff will solve parapsychology's problems, citing past commissions and the nature of scientific evidence as a social and historical process. He advocates for patience and modesty, recognizing that even small problems take time to solve.

Gerald C. Mertens frames his comments around the concept of a "Hard Line Continuum" for viewing the paranormal, placing himself to the left of figures like Randi and Skinner. He praises Hövelmann's recommendations as generally good for explaining human behavior, suggesting that psychology, sociology, and psychiatry could all benefit. Mertens believes that following Hövelmann's recommendations would provide significant data. However, he identifies a missing recommendation: ensuring studies are free of fraud, dupes, chance exaggerations, and overlooked "real world principles." He notes that ESP practitioners often profit from public belief and that the field has a history of hoaxes, necessitating assurances of fraud precautions.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes throughout these commentaries include the critical importance of rigorous scientific methodology in parapsychology, the need for clear and standardized terminology, the complex relationship between researchers and critics, and the cautious approach required when interpreting findings, particularly concerning profound questions like life after death. There is a general consensus among the commentators that while Hövelmann's recommendations are valuable and well-articulated, their implementation requires careful consideration of practical challenges, the social dynamics of the field, and the ongoing need for empirical evidence and transparency. The overall stance leans towards advocating for a more mature, scientifically grounded, and less sensationalist approach to parapsychology, while acknowledging the field's unique challenges and the potential for significant discoveries.

This issue of the Journal of Scientific Exploration, Volume 1, Number 2, dated March 1980, presents a critical examination of parapsychology through a series of comments on a paper by Gerd Hövelmann. The publication, likely from the USA, features discussions on scientific methodology, skepticism, and the legitimacy of parapsychological research within the broader scientific community.

Gerd Hövelmann's Paper and Initial Reactions

The central focus is Hövelmann's paper, which appears to advocate for a more rigorous, orthodox scientific approach to parapsychology to gain acceptance. The initial commentary from the author of the first section expresses a personal skepticism towards spiritualism and the evidence presented, drawing parallels to personal experiences with LSD experiments. This author emphasizes the need for good, strong evidence and open-mindedness, while also noting a potential 'hidden agenda' in some research approaches.

Comments by Robert Morris

Robert Morris generally agrees with Hövelmann's recommendations, particularly the idea that 'revolutionary' claims can be off-putting to mainstream science. He suggests that while parapsychology might lead to new concepts, the methodology can remain orthodox. Morris has mixed feelings about the survival issue, agreeing that current research says little about it but not advocating for its cessation. He believes that research into anomalous human experiences can help in understanding and handling them, potentially opening new areas of knowledge. Morris also notes a slight contradiction in Hövelmann's stance on age and expertise.

Comments by Carroll B. Nash

Carroll B. Nash, as chairman of the session where Hövelmann presented his paper, offers his comments on seven recommendations. Nash agrees that parapsychology may have a revolutionary effect by linking mind and matter, especially with developments in quantum physics. He asserts that the study of survival is not inherently unscientific and that parsimony applies to both 'super-ESP' and spirit hypotheses. Nash supports experimental testing of psychic phenomena, even in quasi-experimental settings, and emphasizes the need for standardized terminology. He also agrees with Hövelmann's recommendation to avoid the occult and to adhere to the scientific method. However, Nash expresses reservations about the idea of a scientific commission to evaluate paranormal phenomena, fearing it could become a self-perpetuating body that stifles new research.

Comments by Irmgard Oepen

Irmgard Oepen, a German skeptic in forensic medicine, regrets not being able to comment directly but authorizes Piet Hein Hoebens to summarize her views. Oepen applauds Hövelmann's call for more skepticism and notes that he doesn't fit the stereotype of a credulous researcher. However, she argues that self-criticism alone is insufficient for scientific respectability; a mature science requires rigorous methods and substantial findings, which she finds lacking in parapsychology. Oepen views financial encouragement of parapsychological research as a poor investment, citing a century without convincing breakthroughs. She also points out the danger of parapsychology lending legitimacy to 'alternative medicine' quackery, such as that found in the Philippines, and welcomes Hövelmann's denunciation of charlatans.

Comments by John Palmer

John Palmer commends Hövelmann's paper as thoughtful and useful, agreeing with most recommendations. He criticizes parapsychology's 'revolutionary pretensions' as an obstacle to scientific acceptance, suggesting cooperation rather than competition with mainstream science. Palmer particularly appreciates Hövelmann's emphasis on terminology, highlighting the need for descriptive, theoretically neutral terms. He argues that current terminology can create an illusion of explanation. Palmer's main criticism is Hövelmann's rigid view of science, which he finds unrealistic for studying the human mind and behavior. He believes that research evidence is a matter of degree and that even inconclusive data can be valuable. Palmer also disagrees with Hövelmann's stance that a lack of practical consequences makes survival research invalid, emphasizing the value of understanding human nature and destiny. He shares reservations about a scientific commission, citing the Condon Commission on UFOs as a cautionary example.

Comments by T.J. Pinch

T.J. Pinch addresses Hövelmann's recommendations for obtaining 'legitimacy and recognition' for parapsychology. He is skeptical of strategies that draw attention to parapsychology's 'non-normality.' Pinch believes that while 'revolutionary' slogans are ineffective, revolutionary change in science is possible under certain circumstances, and psychologists should not neglect this option. He advises against making recommendations on the content of the field, such as abandoning survival research. Pinch also suggests that while case reports are important in some social sciences, they are not a major barrier to acceptance. He finds the distinction between explanation and description less relevant to scientific acceptance. Pinch agrees that inconsistency should not be a virtue and that critics' arguments should be considered, though he believes collaboration might be unproductive. He sees no inherent problem with receiving funding from occult interests, provided it does not interfere with research. His final recommendation is to not abandon the scientific method.

Comments by Steven M. Rosen

Steven M. Rosen criticizes Hövelmann's paper for its 'anachronistic, naive view' of scientific knowledge, which he believes is based on outdated 'Objective Realism' or 'naive Realism.' Rosen argues that the authority of orthodox science has been challenged and that its reliance on Scientific Realism has not prevented global crises. He suggests that the age of methodological reductionism is ending, and classical science's promise of order has not materialized in social sciences. Rosen believes that Hövelmann's rigid adherence to 19th-century scientific standards is unrealistic for studying the human mind and behavior. He also disagrees with the idea that research must have 'concrete purposes' or technological applications to be valuable, emphasizing the importance of understanding human nature and destiny. Rosen also expresses reservations about a scientific commission, drawing parallels to the Condon Commission on UFOs.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this issue revolve around the challenges of establishing parapsychology as a legitimate scientific discipline. There is a strong emphasis on the need for rigorous methodology, empirical evidence, and a critical, skeptical approach. The commentators generally agree that parapsychology has yet to produce convincing breakthroughs and that its 'revolutionary' claims are a hindrance to acceptance. The debate highlights the tension between adhering to established scientific norms and exploring potentially paradigm-shifting phenomena. The overall stance appears to be one of cautious skepticism, advocating for a more disciplined and evidence-based approach to research in the field, while acknowledging the potential value of exploring anomalous phenomena and the human desire to understand consciousness and existence beyond death.

This issue of the Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, identified by its ISSN 0037-9752 and volume 39, features a series of articles and comments primarily focused on the scientific status and methodology of parapsychology. The content delves into the philosophical underpinnings of scientific inquiry, particularly in light of developments in contemporary physics, and critically examines the practices and future directions of parapsychological research.

Psychological Disillusionment and the Limits of Science

The issue opens with reflections on the growing disillusionment within psychology as a science. The text quotes Koch, who critiques psychology's tendency to prioritize methodological procedures over genuine discovery, leading to a "scientistic role playing" that trivializes significant problems. Koch suggests that important sectors of psychological study might benefit from modes of inquiry more akin to the humanities. He advocates for a psychology that embraces ambiguity and mystery, accepting intellectual finitude rather than pursuing "grandiose pseudoknowledge."

Epistemological Challenges from Physics

The epistemological problem extends beyond the social sciences into the natural sciences, particularly physics. The text highlights paradoxes and uncertainties arising from contemporary physics' attempts to probe scale extremes. Physicists like Henry Stapp and David Bohm, along with philosopher Milic Capek, are cited for their work on the "anomalous" developments in physical science, including non-linearities and "radical connectedness." These observations are presented as evidence for the "bankruptcy of Scientific Realism" and the need for a more human, participatory, and aesthetic approach to science. The issue posits that the "house of classical science is not in order," with social sciences, once extensions of this house, now seeking independent residences.

The Neighborhood of Science and Parapsychology's Entry

The text uses the metaphor of a "neighborhood" to describe the scientific establishment. Many non-residents (those outside the mainstream) wonder if the neighborhood is still benefiting from the old establishment, noting cracks in its foundations. For those seeking admission, the conditions may be difficult, requiring a shedding of "nineteenth century illusions about science." The article argues that to realistically evaluate parapsychology's role, one must allow the light of twentieth-century developments to shine through. It suggests that while some social sciences might develop methodological alternatives independently, parapsychological processes, being intersubjective and having a physical manifestation, necessitate engagement with the methods and concerns of physical science. The author expresses concern that parapsychologists may be trying to fit into an "intersubjective" mold, concealing the inherent "perversities" of their field, driven by "status fantasies" rather than a realistic appraisal of their role.

The "great irony" of parapsychology is that in striving to conform to an idealized image of science, science itself is being revealed at its base. The text suggests that those clinging to "rigid orthodoxy" may resist these tremors, but those who "overcome the fear of being who we are" might find a welcome through a "downstairs entrance" from colleagues working in the foundations.

Gerd Hövelmann's Recommendations and Critical Responses

A significant portion of the issue is dedicated to comments on Gerd Hövelmann's recommendations for parapsychology. Hövelmann's stance is described as critical but not entirely divorced from the field, using terms like "our field" and "we." His approach is contrasted with critics like James Randi, who are seen as disclaiming any association with parapsychology while still engaging with its data.

Comments by Gertrude R. Schmeidler

Schmeidler finds Hövelmann's advice for "scrupulous attention to facts" sound but believes his argument against exploring unmapped areas is overly conservative. She agrees with some of his recommendations, such as distinguishing the scientific from the pseudoscientific, but finds others problematic. She argues that parapsychologists should not give up their "revolutionary outlook," as this hope fuels research. She also defends the expression of opinions on survival research, provided personal opinions are clearly differentiated from evidence. While agreeing that reliance on "spontaneous cases" should not be "too heavily" emphasized, she questions whether they should be entirely dismissed, as they can lead to hunches for new research.

Comments by Douglas M. Stokes

Stokes commends Hövelmann for his reasonable tone and for including himself within the field of parapsychology. He agrees with Hövelmann's call for parapsychologists to distance themselves from "pseudoscientists and the occult lunatic fringe," warning against associating parapsychology with pseudoscientific pursuits like astrology. However, Stokes disagrees with several of Hövelmann's points. He argues that the definition of "scientific" is complex and that many parapsychologists have well-examined ideas about science. He finds Hövelmann's assertion that there is "no revolution at all" in parapsychology difficult to understand, citing Helmut Schmidt's research as evidence that cannot be explained by existing physics theories. Stokes also disputes the idea that repeatability is impossible for parapsychology for "theoretical reasons," and he sees value in survival research as a challenge to materialism.

Comments by Christopher Scott

Scott views parts of Hövelmann's article as a critique of parapsychological evidence, particularly regarding survival research and spontaneous cases. He agrees that the evidence for survival is often negligible and that spontaneous cases are of little value. However, he argues that Hövelmann's recommendations primarily concern "talk" rather than "scientific practice" (experiments). Scott believes that if parapsychologists continue to conduct "bad experiments," improving their discourse will not improve the quality of their findings. He aligns himself with the skeptical customer, waiting to be convinced by better experimental results.

Comments by Ulrich Timm

Timm finds Hövelmann's recommendations to be self-evident principles for sound empirical scientific research, familiar to trained parapsychologists. He agrees that parapsychology's subject matter is "unorthodox" and requires a "paradigm switch" or "scientific revolution" in the contemporary scientific view of the world. However, he finds it superfluous to label parapsychology a "revolutionary science." Timm believes the survival problem is amenable to empirical investigation and that parapsychology can contribute to its solution. He also states that "personal evidence" is a separate phenomenon that can motivate research, even without objective evidence. While finding the development of a standardized terminology useful, he does not see it as an urgent task for a field still in its trial-and-error phase.

Comments by Jerome Tobacyk

Tobacyk discusses Hövelmann's seven recommendations for facilitating parapsychology's acceptance. He suggests that the "revolutionary attitude" among some parapsychologists may stem from their rejection by the orthodox scientific community, citing Cognitive Dissonance Theory and Reactance Theory. He argues that this attitude can have adaptive consequences, motivating continued research and decreasing the possibility of Type II errors (failing to detect a real phenomenon). Tobacyk believes that the high likelihood of attempted replications makes long-term acceptance of findings due to Type I errors unlikely.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this issue revolve around the definition and practice of science, the epistemological challenges posed by both psychology and physics, and the specific issues facing parapsychology. There is a clear tension between adhering to orthodox scientific methods and the need for potentially revolutionary approaches to study phenomena that defy current scientific paradigms. The commentators, while largely agreeing on the need for rigor and critical evaluation, diverge on the extent to which parapsychology should embrace or reject its "revolutionary" potential and how it should engage with controversial areas like survival research. The overall stance appears to be one of critical engagement, advocating for methodological soundness while acknowledging the profound questions raised by parapsychological inquiry and the evolving landscape of science itself.

This issue of Zetetic Scholar, dated 1983, is identified as issue number 11. It features a collection of book reviews and commentary on the field of parapsychology and its relationship with scientific methodology.

Commentary on Parapsychology and Scientific Method

The issue presents a robust debate concerning Gerd Hövelmann's recommendations for parapsychologists. Rhea White, in her commentary, argues that parapsychologists should not only adopt established scientific methods but should aim to revolutionize scientific method itself. She emphasizes that scientific revolutions arise from conceiving reality in a way that resolves old problems and accommodates new facts, and that parapsychology's aim is to understand the nature of reality. White agrees with Hövelmann that scientific revolutions are not programmatic but emerge organically. She also defends research into the survival problem, asserting that methodology, not subject matter, determines scientific validity. White disagrees with Hövelmann's assertion that parapsychology should be free of ideological speculation, arguing that speculation is inherent in scientific inquiry and that the subject matter of parapsychology necessitates exploring the nature of mind and the universe.

Leonard Zusne, in his commentary, acknowledges that parapsychologists have been guilty of the issues Hövelmann raises and that improving public presentation could lead to greater recognition. However, Zusne views Hövelmann's recommendations as 'in-house rules' that address method and public relations rather than the root cause of parapsychology's problems. He posits that the fundamental issue is the worldview or philosophy that informs the interpretation of data. Zusne distinguishes between a 'demonstrative' worldview, which is open to phenomena like out-of-body experiences and non-physical intervention, and a 'dialectic' worldview. He argues that a demonstrative view, common among those studying anomalies, provides an advantage in research because it doesn't require abandoning a revolutionary outlook or struggling with the problem of survival after death. Zusne concludes that Hövelmann's recommendations, while reasonable, are cosmetic and do not address the underlying philosophical underpinnings of parapsychology.

Book Reviews

Stargazers and Gravediggers by Immanuel Velikovsky

Reviewed by Henry H. Bauer, this book is Velikovsky's posthumous memoir of the 'Velikovsky Affair.' Bauer notes that the significance of the controversy lies in differing views on the merit of Velikovsky's claims about chronology and planetary motion, and the manner in which science handles revolutionary ideas. Bauer, who finds no merit in Velikovsky's substantive claims, nevertheless found the book enjoyable for its skillful demolition of critics like Harlow Shapley and Cecilia Payne-Gaposchkin. The review highlights Velikovsky's documentation of unscrupulous behavior by his critics and his own misconceptions about scientific practice. Bauer points out that the book provides support for criticisms of Velikovsky's pamphlet 'Cosmos Without Gravitation' and his self-importance. The review concludes that 'Stargazers and Gravediggers' offers more fuel for the controversy and is indispensable for understanding public attitudes toward science and pseudoscience.

The Fakers: Exploring the Myths of the Supernatural by Danny Korem and Paul Meier

Reviewed by Douglas H. Ruben and Marilyn J. Ruben, this book aims to distinguish 'pseudo-occult' from 'occult' phenomena for a Christian market. Danny Korem, a specialist in legerdemain, and Christian psychiatrist Paul Meier, critique the misdocumentation of events in Christian psychical literature, attributing many phenomena to trickery or ideomotor action. The reviewers note that Korem's explanations are often accompanied by Meier's 'psychiatric commentary,' which, due to his devout Christianity, frequently distorts Korem's naturalistic skepticism. Chapter 12 is singled out for its 'emotional ontological argument' for biblical scriptures, which the reviewers find incompatible with Korem's critique of fakery. They question whether Korem sacrificed scientific reasoning for publication by including religious fervor. The review suggests that Korem's need for religious content may have been to ensure publication, a move that discourages the behavioral science community.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

This issue of Zetetic Scholar strongly engages with the nature of scientific inquiry, particularly within parapsychology. The recurring themes include the definition and application of the scientific method, the role of philosophical worldview in interpreting data, the challenges of distinguishing genuine phenomena from fraud, and the historical controversies surrounding figures like Immanuel Velikovsky. The editorial stance appears to favor rigorous scientific investigation and critical evaluation, while also acknowledging the importance of open-mindedness to novel ideas and the need to address phenomena that challenge conventional scientific understanding. The publication provides a platform for critical commentary and diverse perspectives on these complex issues.

This issue of Zetetic Scholar, identified as #11 and dated 1983, is primarily a review of books related to anomalies, parapsychology, and the paranormal. The issue also provides detailed information about the Center for Scientific Anomalies Research (CSAR), its mission, organization, and personnel.

Books Briefly Noted

The "BOOKS BRIEFLY NOTED" section, annotated by Marcello Truzzi, offers concise reviews of a wide array of recent publications. These reviews cover diverse topics including:

• Parapsychology and Psi Phenomena: Books on parapsychology, survival evidence, mediumship, and the sociology of psi research are reviewed. Authors like Hans Bender, Roberto Assagioli, and R.A. McConnell are mentioned. Specific titles include "SPEKTRUM DER PARAPSYCHOLOGIE," "ADVANCES IN PARAPSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH, VOLUME 3," and "PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND SELF-DECEPTION IN SCIENCE."
• UFOs and Anomalous Phenomena: Numerous books on UFO sightings, theories, and related phenomena are discussed. Philip J. Klass's critical work "UFOS: THE PUBLIC DECEIVED" is reviewed, along with Loren E. Gross's historical study "UFOS: A HISTORY, VOLUME ONE: JULY 1947-DECEMBER 1948." Other titles include "FLYING SAUCERS: MAGIC IN THE SKIES" and "ANTIGRAVITY AND UFOS."
• Cryptozoology and Folklore: Books on mythical creatures and folklore are featured, such as Daniel Cohen's "THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MONSTERS," George M. Eberhart's "MONSTERS," and Richard M. Dorson's "MAN AND BEAST IN AMERICAN COMIC LEGEND."
• Sociology of Science and Pseudoscience: Several books examine the demarcation between science and pseudoscience, the social aspects of scientific discovery, and the history of scientific thought. Titles like "THE SOCIAL BASIS OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES," "SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE," and "PSYCHOLOGY'S OCCULT DOUBLES" are highlighted.
• History of Science and Magic: Books on the history of magic, including Houdini, and the history of science are reviewed. "HOUDINI'S HISTORY OF MAGIC IN BOSTON, 1792-1915" and "SCIENCE: ITS HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT AMONG THE WORLD'S CULTURE" are among them.
• Other Anomalies and Esoterica: Reviews also extend to topics like ghosts and apparitions ("GHOST AND GHOUL," "HAUNTINGS AND APPARITIONS"), divination, ancient technologies, and alternative medicine.

Many reviews offer critical commentary, assessing the scholarly merit, biases, and contributions of the reviewed works to the field of anomaly research.

Center for Scientific Anomalies Research (CSAR)

The latter part of the issue is dedicated to detailing the Center for Scientific Anomalies Research (CSAR). It is described as a private center founded to promote responsible scientific inquiry into anomalies and the paranormal.

CSAR's Mission and Activities:

• Advancing the interdisciplinary study of alleged and verified anomalies.
• Acting as a clearinghouse for scientific anomaly research.
• Publishing a journal (ZETETIC SCHOLAR), a newsletter (THE CSAR BULLETIN), research reports, and bibliographies.
• Creating a public network of experts through a CSAR DIRECTORY OF CONSULTANTS.
• Promoting the dissemination of information about anomaly research.
• Sponsoring conferences, lectures, and symposia.
• Improving communication between critics and proponents of scientific anomalies.

Leadership and Consultants:

The Director of CSAR is Dr. Marcello Truzzi, and the Associate Director is Dr. Ronald Westrum. CSAR is sponsored by a board of Senior (Science) Consultants and Senior Resource Consultants. The list of Senior Science Consultants includes distinguished academics from various fields such as astronomy, psychology, statistics, and philosophy, including notable figures like J. Allen Hynek, Hans J. Eysenck, and I.J. Good. The Senior Resource Consultants are recognized experts in bibliographical and archival resources, including figures like Milbourne Christopher and Martin Ebon.

CSAR's Orientation:

CSAR's primary focus is on the study and evaluation of anomalous observations, emphasizing a scientific approach, placing the burden of proof on the claimant, and requiring proof commensurate with the extraordinary nature of the claim. The Center aims for constructive skepticism and welcomes legitimate anomalies as potential drivers for scientific progress.

Organization and Membership:

CSAR is governed by a board, and individuals can associate with the Center in various capacities: Senior Consultants, Consultants, Members, Patrons, Monitors, and Research Associates. Membership involves subscribing to CSAR's philosophy and paying an annual fee, which grants access to publications and other privileges. The issue also lists individuals who will appear in the forthcoming CSAR DIRECTORY OF CONSULTANTS, inviting qualified applicants to join the network.

Recurring Themes and Editorial Stance

The recurring themes in this issue revolve around the critical evaluation of anomalous claims, the sociology of science, and the importance of rigorous, interdisciplinary research. The editorial stance, as reflected in the reviews and the description of CSAR, is one of constructive skepticism, advocating for scientific methodology in the study of phenomena that lie outside conventional understanding. There is a clear emphasis on distinguishing between well-supported evidence and speculation, and on fostering open dialogue between proponents and critics of anomalous phenomena. The publication of "BOOKS BRIEFLY NOTED" underscores a commitment to informing the readership about the current literature in these fields, while the detailed explanation of CSAR highlights the organization's dedication to advancing the scientific study of anomalies.